Stabilization, Extraversions and Political Settlements in Somalia by Hagmann, Tobias
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stabilization, Extraversions and Political Settlements in Somalia
Citation for published version:
Hagmann, T 2016, Stabilization, Extraversions and Political Settlements in Somalia. Political Settlements
Reports, Rift Valley Institute.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
Stabilization, Extraversion 
and Political Settlements 
in Somalia 
Tobias Hagmann
RiFT VaLLEY insTiTUTE | PsRP
RiFT VaLLEY insTiTUTE | PsRP
Stabilization, Extraversion and  
Political Settlements in Somalia
Tobias Hagmann
Published in 2016 by the Rift Valley Institute
26 St Luke’s Mews, London W11 1DF, United Kingdom
PO Box 52771 GPO, 00100 Nairobi, Kenya
THE RiFT VaLLEY insTiTUTE (RVi)
The Rift Valley Institute (www.riftvalley.net) works in eastern and central Africa to bring 
local knowledge to bear on social, political and economic development.
THE PoLiTiCaL sETTLEmEnTs REsEaRCH PRogRammE (PsRP)
The Political Settlements Research Programme, made up of a North-South Consortium 
of five organizations, examines how political settlements come into being, how open and 
inclusive they are, and how internal and external actors shape them. 
THE aUTHoR
Tobias Hagmann is an associate professor at the Department of Social Sciences and Business 
at Roskilde University in Denmark.
REsEaRCH assisTanT
Naima Elmi. She bears no responsibility for the contents of the report.
DisCLaimER
This report is an output from the Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP), funded 
by the UK Aid from the UK Department for International Development (DFID) for the 
benefit of developing countries. However, the views expressed and information contained in 
it are not necessarily those of or endorsed by DFID, which can accept no responsibility for 
such views or information or for any reliance placed on them. 
CREDiTs
RVi aCTing EXECUTiVE DiRECToR: Philip Winter
RVi HoRn oF aFRiCa & EasT aFRiCa REgionaL DiRECToR: Mark Bradbury
RVi gREaT LaKEs PRogRammE managER: Michel Thill
RVi PRogRammE managER, PUbLiCaTions: Tymon Kiepe
EDiToRs: Jason Mosley and Kate McGuiness
DEsign: Lindsay Nash
maPs: Jillian Luff, MAPgrafix
DigiTaL PRoDUCTion: Connor Clerke
isbn 978-1-907431-44-9
CoVER: A woman at a gate decorated with the Somali flag inside Villa Somalia in 
Mogadishu, the office and residence of the President of Somalia.
RigHTs
Copyright © Rift Valley Institute 2016
Cover image © AU/UN IST 2010
Text and maps published under Creative Commons License
Attribution-Noncommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
Available for free download at www.riftvalley.net
Printed copies are available from Amazon and other online retailers, and from selected 
bookstores.
Er Roseires
Asosa
Nimule
Dodoma
UGANDA
TANZANIA
SUDAN
EGYPT
   Gu
lf of Tad
joura
AtbaraN
ile
Sobat
Blue Nile
Lake
Kyoga
Kapoeta
Er Roseires
Arusha
Bor
Torit
Khartoum
Kampala
Juba
SOUTH
SUDAN
San‘a
YEMEN
SAUDI ARABIA
Setit
Aw
ash
Gilo
Tana
Dawa
Om
o
Abay Wenz
Webi Jubba
GalanaTsavo
Wabi Shebeele 
Wabi Gesiro 
Ganale
Abd-Al-Kuri
Pate I.
Manda I.
Lamu I.
Pemba
Island
Zanzibar
Island
Hanish
Is
Dahlak
       Archipelago
I N D I A N
O C E A N
R
e
d
 
S
e
a
G u
l f
 o
f  
A
d
e
n
Bab el M
andeb
Lake
Turkana
Abaya Hayk
Lake Tana
Lake Victoria
E t h i o p i a n
P l a t e a u
C h a l b i
D e s e r t
Talo
Tulu Dimtu
4377m
Mt Kenya 5199m
Abuye Meda
3599m
Ra’s
Farfak
Ras Caseyr
Ras
Xaafuun
Ras Kamboni
C
h
’ o
k
’ e
 
M
e n
d e
b o
Audo Range
G r
e a
t  
R i
f t
 V
a
l l
e y
Mt  Elgon 4321m
Afar
Depression
D a n
a k
i l  
D e s
e r t
Ah
am
ar
O
g
a
d
e
n
Mandhera
Machakos
NanyukiNyahururu
Voi
Sodo
Godey
Degehabur
Aksum
Wardheer
Qabridehar
Filtu
Qardho
Caluula
Bandarbayle
Eyl
Taleex
Wajir
Isiolo
MoyaleLodwar
Afmedaw
Baardheere
Baraawe
Lugh
Jilib
Hobyo
Xarardheere
Boorama
Laas QorayGonder
Nazret
Jima
Dolo Adow
Ferfer
Jariiban 
Garissa
Aysaita
Bahir Dar
Gambela
Harar
Jijiga
Awasa
Mekele
Dire
Dawa
Kismaayo
Garbahaarrey
Dhuusa
Marreeb
Bosaaso
Laascaanood
Burco
Ceerigaabo
Gaalkacyo
Aseb
Barentu
Massawa
Keren
EmbuNyeri
Dikhil
Obok
Kisumu Nakuru
Mombasa
Baydhabo
Xuddur
Jawhar
Marka
Beled Weyne
Dar es Salaam
Berbera
Badhan
Cadaado
Asmara
Addis Ababa
Djibouti
Muqdisho (Mogadishu)
Nairobi
Hargeysa
Garoowe
SOMALIA
ETHIOPIA
KENYA
ERITREA
DJIBOUTI
Somaliland
Elemi Triangle
(Under Kenyan
administration)
P
u
n
t l
a
n
d
N
 M
A
P
grax 2014
International
boundary
Disputed
boundary
National capital
Other town
or village
Selected railway
Selected road 
or track
Selected river
Lake
0 400km
©  Rift Valley Institute 2014 
Boundaries and names shown do not imply
endorsement by the RVI or any other bodywww.riftvalley.net
Nairobi
Filtu
Boundaries are approximate
Map 1. Horn of Africa
Mandheera
A u d o
 R
a
n
g
e
A h
a m
a r
O
g
a
d
e
n
H
a
u
d
Ganale
W
ebi Gesiro
K’elafo
Imi
Dolo Adow
Aware
Kabribehay
Gashaamo
Danot Bokh
Sheygosh
Garbo
Biye K’obe
Serdo
Wardheer
Qabridehar
Dhagaxbuur
Godey
Hargele
Fiq
Harar
JijigaDire Dawa
Aseb
     Galaadi 
Aysaita
Dikhil
Ali Sabieh
Obok
Tadjourah
Arta
Harshin
KENYA
ETHIOPIA
YEMEN
Webi Jubba
Webi Shabeele
I N D I A N
O C E A N
G u
l f
 o
f  
A
d
e
nBab el Mandeb
Gulf 
of Tad
joura
Ras
Xaafuun
Ras Casayr
Ras Kamboni
G o l
i s  M o
u n t a i n
s
Hobyo
Ceel Buur
Jariiban 
Baraawe
Cadalle
Buur Gaabo
 Jamaame
Buulobarde
Jalalaqsi
JilibAfmadow
Baardheere
Ceel Waaq
Luuq
Buula Xaawa Waajid
Qoryooley
Afgooye
Buurxakaba
Diinsor
Wanlaweyn
Balcad
Ceel dheer
Xarardheere
Ceel Barde
Eyl
Garacad
Burtinle
Qardho
Sheekh
Buula Xaawa Bandarbayle
Berbera
Caluula
Qandala Bargaal
Iskushuban
Saylac
Lughaya
Xaafuun
Laasqorey
Badhan
Gabiley Mandheera
Buuhoodle
Widhwidh
Xudun
Taleex
Gar’adag
Ceel Afweyn
Maydh
Xiis
Ferfer
Oodweyne
Tog Wajaale
Caynabo
Caabudwaaq
Cadaado
Baki
Kismaayo
Bu’aale
Garbahaarrey
Jawhar
Dhuusamarreeb
Bosaaso
Laascaanood
Burco
Ceerigaabo
Gaalkacayo
Baydhabo
Xuddur
Marka
Beledweyne
Boorame
Mogadishu
(Muqdisho)
Djibouti
Hargeysa
Garoowe
DJIBOUTI
P
u
n
t
l
a
n
d
SOMALIA
S o m a l i l a n d
International
boundary
Disputed boundary
National capital
Capital
Chief town
Other town or village
Road
Selected river
Lake
N
 M
A
P
grax 2015
©  Rift Valley Institute 2015
Boundaries and names shown do not imply
endorsement by the RVI or any other bodywww.riftvalley.net
Boundaries are approximate
0 200km
Map 2. Somalia
Summary 6
1. Introduction 8
2. Statebuilding in Somalia, now and then 16
3. Selected political elites and settlements 27
4. Somali statebuilding by extraversion 37
5. Conclusion 57
6. Policy implications 60
Glossary of acronyms, words and phrases 62
Bibliography 64
Map 1.   Horn of Africa 3
Map 2. Somalia  4
Contents
6Summary
Past and present attempts to stabilize war-torn Somalia through military, 
diplomatic and humanitarian interventions highlight the entanglements 
and interplay between local and foreign elites in policies and practices that 
have frequently and effectively undermined statebuilding in south-central 
Somalia. Existing analyses have focused predominantly on local actors 
and internal dynamics to account for the continuous political disorder 
in the former Somali Democratic Republic since 1991. In contrast, this 
study highlights the role of external aid in dysfunctional statebuilding 
efforts in Somalia. Rather than assuming that foreign actors are outside 
the local and national political settlements, such actors should rather 
be seen as an integral part of these processes. Consequently, the power 
and interests of both Somali and international actors must be taken into 
consideration in order to understand the shortcomings of stabilization 
policies. Persistent tactics by Somali elites—mobilizing, appropriating 
and redirecting foreign resources and agendas—have been at the core 
of failed statebuilding. Such tactics form part of what French Africanist 
Jean-François Bayart has described as ‘extraversion’. Because Somali 
elites have regularly turned their participation in transitional govern-
ments into a resource appropriation tactic, statebuilding has become an 
end in itself rather than the outcome of a more profound process of actual 
state formation that would have entailed the centralization of coercion, 
the generation of public revenue or the building up of popular support.
The report highlights four findings that partly echo existing scholarship 
but also offer new insights for statebuilding and political settlements. 
Firstly, in south-central Somalia a recurrent negative relationship between 
external stabilization attempts and peaceful political settlements can 
be observed. More significantly, coercive external statebuilding has 
encouraged violent attempts to produce a political settlement within the 
country. This holds particularly true for the time periods of 1991–1995 and 
2006–2016 in south-central Somalia—and inversely, also for Somaliland 
after 1991, where external statebuilding efforts were minimal. Secondly, 
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while both political settlements and international interventions in 
Somalia have changed over time, some of the forms of extraversion have 
remained constant. The use of coercion, the appropri ation of external 
resources, flight and trickery have been obstacles to more peaceful 
political settlements. They have led statebuilders to favour the creation 
of formal institutions as a prerequisite—rather than an outcome—of 
actual state formation. Thirdly, selective or partial recognition is the key 
foreign policy mechanism by which authority and resources are bestowed 
upon Somali constituencies in particular times and particular places. 
This recognition has fueled political competition, rewarded abuse and 
ineffective governance, and repeatedly encouraged the creation of brief-
case organizations—including, most recently, federal member states. 
Lastly, the extraversion of foreign aid and external stabilization has been 
so long-standing and entrenched that donors and the range of external 
actors aiming to influence political developments in Somalia have become 
an integral part of these processes.
81. Introduction
Since 1991, Somalis and foreigners have tried periodically to reconstruct 
some form of centralized state authority in Somalia, with the intention 
of reducing violence and insecurity and improving lives and livelihoods. 
These attempts to stabilize and pacify war-torn Somalia have evolved 
considerably over the past two and a half decades. Interventions have 
included humanitarian relief, capacity-building, statebuilding, peace-
building, security sector support, and direct external military support for 
counterterrorism and anti-piracy activities.1 Yet these efforts have been 
undermined by a number of factors: evolving conflict dynamics from 
warlord politics to militant Islamism; profound distrust, grievances and 
trauma; the sheer number of people with a stake in Somali politics; and 
repeated political and humanitarian crises. A broad range of factors has 
contributed to the recurring political instability in post-1991 Somalia. 
The most prominent among these are the segmentary social fabric of 
Somali society—clannishness, tribalism—Somali distrust of centralized 
and, more often than not, predatory state authority, constituencies that 
benefit from armed conflict and ill-informed donor assistance and foreign 
policy initiatives. 
What accounts for the failure and limited success of external stabiliza-
tion policies in Somalia in terms of producing their desired outcomes? 
What impact did these statebuilding interventions have, or not have, 
on political actors, processes and events in war-torn Somalia? And to 
what degree did they transform existing or potential political settle-
ments in the country? These questions can be addressed by focusing 
both on the broader conditions in which stabilization policies have been 
implemented in south-central Somalia and the recurrent patterns that 
have characterized relations between select powerful elites. In examining 
1 Somalia ‘has been the scene of some of the most ambitious, precedent-setting external 
stabilization operations in the post-Cold War period’. Source: K. Menkhaus, ‘Stabilisation 
and humanitarian access in a collapsed state: the Somali case’, Disasters 34/3 (2010), 
320–41 (320).
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these questions, this study pays particular attention to what the existing 
area studies literature reveals, often implicitly, about evolving political 
settlements in Somalia. Despite the establishment of the Federal Govern-
ment of Somalia (FGS) in August 2012, south-central Somalia remains in 
a state of profound political fragmentation and state failure.
A political settlement means different things to different people.2 In 
its most commonsense form, it refers to the process by which domestic 
political and economic elites compete for power and, eventually, settle 
on an agreement.3 More recently, political economists studying how 
institutions govern violence and economic growth have further devel-
oped the concept.4 With particular reference to developing countries 
characterized by clientelism,5 a political settlement can be defined as ‘a 
combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and 
also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability’.6 At the 
macro level, a political settlement resembles a social order, capturing how 
a given society at a given time manages violence, maintains stability and 
produces welfare. At the micro level, a political settlement can be defined 
as ‘an institutional structure that creates benefits for different classes and 
2 See J. Di John and J. Putzel, ‘Political Settlements’, GSDRC Issues Paper, June 2009.
3 Hence the notion of ‘negotiated political settlement’, of which post-apartheid South 
Africa is a good example.
4 Much of this literature draws on new institutional economics, which explains the role 
of social and legal norms—institutions—in producing economic outcomes and public 
goods. For example, see D. Acemoglu and J. A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship 
and Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006 and D. C. North et al., 
Violence and Social Orders. A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
5 Clientelism describes patron-client relations in political decision-making and resource 
allocation characterized by personal rule, coercion and the co-existence of legal-rational 
and more informal rules. See R. Lemarchand and K. Legg, ‘Political clientelism and 
development: a preliminary analysis’, Comparative Politics 4/2 (1972), 149–78 and G. 
Erdmann and U. Engel, ‘Neopatrimonialism reconsidered: critical review and elaboration 
of an elusive concept’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 45/1 (2007), 95–119. 
6 M. H. Khan, Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions, 
London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 2010, 4.
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groups in line with their relative power’.7 No stable political settlement 
has emerged in post-1991 Somalia, since formal institutions are neither 
functioning nor growth-oriented and significant power holders are not 
aligned with formal institutions.8 Political settlements in Somalia have 
thus been unstable, marked by coercion and a heavy dependence on inter-
national support. Consequently, this study refers to political settlements 
not as a theoretical model or policy goal, as apparent in the 2013 Somali 
Compact,9 but to capture evolving interactions between competing elite 
groups, both domestic and foreign, which bargain over the distribution 
of political power and economic rents.10
How have external stabilization efforts affected political settlements 
in post-1991 Somalia? This study argues that ‘elite extraversion’11 is a 
key causal mechanism and regular pattern that has continuously tied 
external interventions to local and national Somali politics. Extra-
version is the process by which groups or individuals ‘employ their 
7 Khan, Political Settlements, 20. Khan’s description of political settlements bears some 
similarity to the idea of ‘political marketplace’ proposed by de Waal. See A. de Waal, 
The Real Politics of the Horn of Africa: Money, War and the Business of Power, Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2015 and A. de Waal, The Political Marketplace: Analyzing Political Entrepreneurs and 
Political Bargaining with a Business Lens, Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation, 2014.
8 Somalia thus represents a ‘political settlement in crisis’ in which ‘most informal 
“economic” activity is supported by or based on the threat of violence’. Source: Khan, 
Political Settlements, 49.
9 For instance, the Somali Compact makes use of political settlements terminology. 
The first priority of its peace and statebuilding goal is to ‘settle relations between the 
federal government and existing and emerging administrations’ and work towards ‘the 
emergence of a national political settlement’. Source: Federal Republic of Somalia, ‘The 
Somali Compact’, Mogadishu: Somali Federal Government, 2013, 5.
10 Political settlements may also be described as ‘on-going processes of bargaining whose 
[sic] end goals are often contested among elites, between elites and other internal actors, 
and between elites, internal interveners and external interveners’. Source: C. Bell, ‘What 
We Talk About When We Talk About Political Settlements. Towards Inclusive and Open 
Political Settlements in an Era of Disillusionment’, PSRP Working Paper, University of 
Edinburgh, 2015, 7.
11 J-F. Bayart, ‘Africa in the world: a history of extraversion’, African Affairs 99/395 (2000), 
217–67.
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dependent relationship with the external world to appropriate resources 
and authority’.12 The term extraversion was first proposed by depen-
dency theorist Samir Amin in 1974 to describe the under-development 
of peripheral economies in a global economy of unequal exchange.13 
Jean-François Bayart further developed the concept to argue that Africa 
had never been disconnected from the world but that, on the contrary, 
its ruling elites had accustomed themselves to make their dependence 
on the colonial metropoles and donors both productive and advanta-
geous.14 This observation fits squarely with present-day Somalia. While 
the 1990s saw the use of extraversion strategies in Africa based on either 
democracy or war,15 the 2000s have been marked by extraversion tactics 
based on statebuilding, security and counterterrorism.16 In other words, 
Somali and other elites convert the very ‘dynamics of dependence’ within 
which they operate into assets.17 Bayart identifies six recurrent modes of 
extraversion in the African continent: coercion, trickery, flight, interme-
diation, appropriation and rejection.18
Bayart’s concept of extraversion is particularly insightful for under-
standing not only Somalia’s relations with the external world but also the 
frequent failures of successive stabilization attempts and their impacts 
on local and national political settlements. The bulk of this report illus-
trates this point empirically and discusses it analytically by identifying 
12 C. Peiffer and P. Englebert, ‘Extraversion, vulnerability to donors, and political 
liberalization in Africa’, African Affairs 111/444 (2101), 355–78 (361), referring to Bayart, 
‘History of extraversion’.
13 Samir Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment, 
New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1974.
14 Referring to Bayart’s ‘History of extraversion’, Kelsall writes, ‘the tendency of Africans 
to seek outside support in their internal struggles, even going so far as to render their 
own subjection and dependence into a deliberate strategy or mode of action’. Source: 
‘Going with the Grain in African Development?’, Discussion Paper No. 1, Africa Power 
and Politics Programme, London: Overseas Development Institute, 2008, 9.
15 Bayart, ‘History of extraversion’.
16 S. Suri, ‘Barbed Wire on our Heads’: Lessons from Counter-terror, Stabilisation and Statebuilding 
in Somalia, London: Saferworld, 2016.
17 Bayart, ‘History of extraversion’, 234.
18 Bayart, ‘History of extraversion’, 254–55.
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recurring extraversion strategies that have marked statebuilding and 
political settlements in Somalia since 1991. This study demonstrates that 
extraversion strategies are central to any understanding of stabilization 
and statebuilding in Somalia. In so doing, this report uses a historical 
and contextual approach that adopts some critical distance from the 
current stabilization policy rhetoric. It also adopts a methodological 
standpoint according to which a priori, clear-cut distinctions between the 
terms ‘local’, ’national’ and ‘global’ make little sense when observing a 
noticeably transnational space, such as contemporary Somalia, which is 
marked by a multiplicity of state and non-state actors who exert de facto 
sovereignty. Much of the general peace and statebuilding literature has 
prioritized international causal factors in its analyses.19 The interpret-
ation in this study shifts the focus towards the relation between local 
and national elite settlements and their interaction with external actors. 
The main argument is that local political settlements in Somalia cannot 
be studied independently of foreign actors and their agendas, because 
political rule in the country has been strongly internationalized.20
Some disclaimers are warranted to delimit the geographical and 
analytical scope of this argument. Firstly, the bulk of this study and 
the political processes reviewed refer to south-central Somalia, where 
external intervention and concomitant extraversion tactics have been 
most prominent.21 The report does not provide an account of the signifi-
cantly different political trajectories of Somaliland and Puntland. These 
two entities emerged not primarily on the basis of extraversion but rather 
19 O. Tansey, ‘Evaluating the legacies of state-building: success, failure, and the role of 
responsibility’, International Studies Quarterly 58/1 (2014), 174–86 (176).
20 See K. Schlichte, ‘Uganda, or: the internationalisation of rule’, Civil Wars 10/4 
(2008), 369–83. A political settlement may be described as ‘transnationalized’ if 
and when external forces have significant influence over its resources, actors and 
dynamics of interaction. Source: P. Yanguas, ‘The influence and responsibility of aid in 
transnationalized political settlements’, paper presented at the International Studies 
Association annual convention, New Orleans, 18–21 February 2015, 5.
21 South-central Somalia does not represent a coherent political entity but is used 
to denominate the territory encompassing the regions of Lower Jubba, Middle Juba, 
Gedo, Bay, Bakool, Lower Shaballe, Banaadir (Mogadishu), Middle Shabelle, Hiraan and 
Galguduud.
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were driven by local elite bargaining and pacts, revenue generation and 
statebuilding that produced durable—if not entirely stable—political 
settlements.22 In many ways Somaliland represents the perfect counter-
example to south-central Somalia in terms of the ability of the former 
to achieve peace and statebuilding with minimal external involvement.23 
Secondly, Bayart’s concept of extraversion should not be understood as 
a normative one that demonizes, in this case, Somalis for the failures of 
state reconstruction. Rather extraversion is used in this study to describe 
the processes by which international interventions are locally embedded 
via the strategic use that actors make of them.24 This approach highlights 
the room for manoeuvre available to those involved in transforming 
external recognition and resources into local clout. To emphasize the 
agency of local political entrepreneurs does not downplay the fact that 
they operate in a state of dependence vis-à-vis the outside world. Extra-
version only takes place because of the paramount role of inter national 
actors, resources and agendas in state-centric stabilization, which 
ultimately accounts for this dependency. While there is a tendency to 
either blame local actors—Somalis—or external interveners—the inter-
national community—this analysis is premised on the assumption that 
the agency of both must be taken into account.25
Finally, stabilization is used both in its narrower and broader sense. In 
its narrower sense, stabilization refers to the ongoing counter-insurgency 
and statebuilding attempts by the Federal Government of Somalia, its 
donors and its allies. In its broader sense, stabilization refers to more 
22 This applies to Somaliland more than to Puntland, which has drifted towards 
extraversion in the past.
23 See T. Hagmann and M. V. Hoehne, ‘Failures of the state failure debate: evidence from 
the Somali territories’, Journal of International Development 21/1 (2009), 42–57.
24 This may also be understood as ‘selective adoption’. See J-P. Olivier de Sardan, 
Anthropology and Development: Understanding Contemporary Social Change, London: Zed 
Books, 2006, 145.
25 This point is made in J. Trapido, ‘Africa’s leaky giant’, New Left Review, 92 March–April 
(2015), 5–40 (8). Although in ‘History of extraversion’, Bayart describes extraversion as 
typically African, it really has been and is practised to different degrees by societies and 
governments around the globe.
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generic peace and statebuilding efforts pursued by Somalis and external 
actors. Although the implementation of stabilization policies and 
programmes in Somalia is intrinsically linked to and affected by local 
and sub-national clan dynamics, this is a phenomenon this study does 
not document empirically. The everyday political effects and workings 
of the visible and invisible boundaries that result from Somali society’s 
segmentary genealogy, commonly referred to as ‘clan’, thus require 
further analysis.
This report draws predominantly on existing published materials, 
namely academic and policy analyses by authors with an established 
track record of data collection in and outside of Somalia, who all publish 
in English.26 These experts are predominantly Western anthropologists 
and political scientists who typically conduct fieldwork either as indepen-
dent researchers or consultants.27 Because of long-standing problems of 
access and security, the existing literature on Somali and inter national 
politics is often fragmentary. It also has a bias towards studying impor-
tant and male-dominated political events or processes, which are of 
interest to donors and diplomats. As is characteristic for such area 
studies, they tend to be primarily empirical and at times use categories or 
labels—for example, the terms ‘warlords’, ‘terrorists’ or ‘elders’—rather 
uncritically. A solid body of literature exists on the tumultuous and ever 
changing political history of present-day Somalia, as well as its political 
and economic elites. Yet authors often favour the use of occupational 
categories—for example businesspersons, government officials—or, 
importantly, clan or geographical affiliations to identify particular elite 
groups. Overall, Somali studies scholarship has a limited track record 
of providing meaningful explanations for the emergence of particular 
social, cultural, economic and political elites in the country. This reflects 
26 Reports published by influential watchdogs like the International Crisis Group, 
Human Rights Watch and the UN monitoring group are usually authored by experts who 
match this profile.
27 This report also draws on selected interviews with aid officials working for NGOs and 
international organizations who are currently involved in stabilization in Somalia. These 
interviews were conducted in Nairobi in July and August 2015.
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one of the enduring legacies of British colonial anthropology, which 
has been preoccupied with clan genealogy, familial ties and, ultimately, 
belonging, more than with processes of class formation, social stratifi-
cation or capital accumulation.
The next section outlines contemporary statebuilding policies 
in Somalia, dissects the stabilization policy paradigm and highlights 
some of the past paradoxes of externally supported statebuilding in 
the country. The third section identifies and discusses a select number 
of elite groups—warlords, the business class and donors—that have 
played important roles in shaping political bargains and unstable political 
settlements since 1991. The fourth section introduces a range of persis-
tent extraversion strategies that have accompanied different phases of 
statebuilding and stabilization in south-central Somalia. It illustrates 
how entrenched extraversion has become in civil war Somalia, and also 
demonstrates historical continuities with the pre-war period and, impor-
tantly, how extraversion has been an obstacle to more durable political 
settlements among local and national elites. The conclusion discusses 
the major findings of this study in view of the broader literature as well 
as a number of policy considerations.
16
2. Statebuilding in Somalia,  
now and then
Since 2013 stabilization has been the overarching policy goal of the Federal 
Government of Somalia (FGS) led by President Hassan Sheikh Moham-
oud.28 The government’s Somali Compact in 2013, which grew out of the 
2011 Busan New Deal principles, puts a premium on the need to stabilize 
security institutions, territory and populations in Somalia.29 Unsur-
prisingly, this emphasis on stability reflects the FGS’s wish to survive 
politically by expanding security and government control in Somalia’s 
south-central regions.30 It also expresses donors’ renewed willingness 
to support and bolster the fledging Mogadishu-based administration 
against its violent competitors, particularly al-Shabaab.31 By adopting the 
stabilization agenda, donors sought to move away from project based 
interventions to a more comprehensive engagement that seeks to bolster 
the search for a more durable political settlement in Somalia. Previous 
transitional governments lacked international recognition and funding. 
Donors have now aligned themselves with the FGS’s security agenda to 
28 See L. Hammond, ‘Somalia rising: things are starting to change for the world’s longest 
failed state’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 7/1 (2013), 183–93.
29 The words ‘stabilize’, ‘stability’ and ‘stabilization’ are mentioned 16 times in the 
Somali Compact. While it is possible that a particular area is stable under insurgent 
administration, stabilization essentially is a euphemism for the need to expand a state 
monopoly of violence.
30 Upon his nomination, President Hassan Sheik Mohamoud described his first three 
priorities as ‘security, security, security’. Source: New Statesman, ‘President of Somalia 
sets up three priorities: security, security, security’, 25 September 2012. The FGS built on 
the TFG’s ‘National Security and Stabilization Plan’ between 2011 and 2014, which served 
‘as the main conduit for alignment of both national and international assistances for the 
implementation of prioritized, coherent, harmonized and sustained security, access to 
justice and stabilization interventions in Somalia’. Source: Somalia Transitional Federal 
Government, ‘National Security and Stabilization Plan’, Mogadishu: Somalia Transitional 
Federal Government, 2011, 3.
31 R. Marchal, ‘A tentative assessment of the Somali Harakat Al-Shabaab’, Journal of 
Eastern African Studies 3/3 (2009), 381–404.
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such an extent that it is difficult to distinguish which is the driving force 
behind current stabilization programmes in Somalia. The basic premise 
of these programmes is that territory conquered by the African Union 
Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Army (SNA) 
must be stabilized in order to bring it permanently under government 
control and prevent a renewed loss to al-Shabaab. 
The Somali Minister of Interior and Federalism, working with donors 
and consultants, is at the helm of the stabilization of what are referred 
to as the ‘newly accessible areas’.32 How did the FGS and donors envision 
the stabilization of south-central Somalia? On paper, stabilization was 
to proceed in linear fashion, with district-level caretaker administrations 
and peace and stability committees providing basic governance in the 
first two months after liberation, followed by the formation of interim 
district administrations.33 In reality, tensions between Mogadishu and 
the regions, local conflicts, boundary disputes, infighting within the FGS 
and the slowing down of the AMISOM offensive against al-Shabaab in 
2015 thwarted stabilization in most of the regions.34 
Current state-centric stabilization policies and measures implemented 
by the FGS and the international community are an awkward mixture 
of technocratic and political motifs. On the one hand, stabilization has 
succumbed to the management logic of international aid as it has been 
translated into project log-frames, deliverables, budgets, infrastructure 
and capacity-building—giving it a technocratic and somewhat apolitical 
32 Ministry of Interior and Federalism (MoIF), ‘Stabilization of the Newly Accessible 
Areas Through Local Administrations’, Mogadishu: Federal Government of Somalia, 2013.
33 MoIF, ‘Stabilization’. MoIF documents on file with the author put the infrastructural 
price tag of 25 districts to be recovered at USD 300,000 per district, covering the costs 
for building an administration building, a court and a police station. The MoIF budgeted 
an additional USD 242,000 per district for the running of the caretaker and interim 
administration.
34 See International Crisis Group, ‘Somalia: Al-Shabaab—It Will Be a Long War’, Africa 
Briefing no. 99, Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 26 June, 2014; M. Bryden 
and T. Thomas, Somalia’s Troubled Transition: Vision 2016 Revisited, Nairobi: Sahan, 2015.
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touch.35 On the other hand, stabilization activities motivated by counter-
terrorism concerns are by definition partisan. Donors who side with 
the FGS’s counter-insurgency do so beyond the classic humanitarian 
principles of impartiality and neutrality.36 Interestingly, this alliance 
with the federal government is accompanied—in official rhetoric and 
policy papers—by a terminology that emphasizes the need for dialogue, 
reconciliation and inclusiveness.37 Another feature of current stabi-
lization efforts in Somalia is that it allows donors and implementing 
agencies to articulate and promote their interventions as contributing to 
stabil ization, even though there is no agreement as to what exactly that 
means.38 One reason donors approve of or commit themselves to stabil-
ization is because it allows for ‘flexibility in both funding and character 
of programmes’.39 As a result, ‘there are too many actors doing the same 
thing under this umbrella of stabilization’, explains a UN staff member.40
The political nature of stabilization interventions is most obvious in 
the quick impact and other projects that accompany the entry of AMISOM 
and the SNA into newly recovered territories. In an attempt to win over 
local communities and stop them backing al-Shabaab, these projects 
aim at producing a peace dividend for local populations. In particular, 
the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union have 
35 In this sense, stabilization underwent a similar process of bureaucratization, just 
as civilian peacebuilding did before it. See L. Goetschel and T. Hagmann, ‘Civilian 
peacebuilding: peace by bureaucratic means?’, Conflict, Security & Development 9/1 (2009), 
55–73.
36 Interview with senior NGO official working in partnership with the FGS, Nairobi,  
22 August 2015.
37 While donors share FGS rejection of al-Shabaab, they took a less partisan position 
with regards to the relationship between the FGS and the federal states, attempting to 
broker agreements between the two.
38 Others argue that donors know what they want to achieve with stabilization in south-
central Somalia but that the prospects for achieving these goals have been unrealistic 
from the onset. 
39 P. Schouten and J. Bachmann, Mapping Stabilization in Policy and Practice. An overview of 
stabilization as a concept and instrument in international interventions in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, South Sudan and Somalia, Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute, 2014, 3.
40 Interview with UN staff member, Nairobi, 21 August 2015.
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funded projects in south-central Somalia in support of the ongoing 
counter-insurgency. For instance, the Somali Stability Fund (SSF), a 
multi-donor initiative financed by Denmark, the EU, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, the UK and the United Arab Emirates, funds grassroots conflict 
resolution, institution-building and governance projects in line with the 
government’s stabilization policy.41 The United States created its own 
stabilization programme in Somalia with the six-year (2010-2016) United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID)–led Transition 
Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS), which aims to ‘increase confidence in 
all levels of government through targeted, strategic interventions that 
improve service delivery and government responsiveness’.42 AMISOM 
also implements high visibility quick impact projects, including the 
construction of schools, health centres and police stations, with funding 
from the EU and the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID).43 The absence of systematic and independent assessments of 
these stabilization projects makes it difficult to judge their effectiveness 
and durability.44 While projects might deliver much-needed infrastruc-
tural or capacity-building results, their ability to deliver desired political 
goals of stabilization is questionable.45
41 The SSF also works with Puntland and the Interim Jubba Administration, which was 
created in February 2012 as an outcome of the London conference on Somalia. The SSF is 
administered by the private consultancy firm Adam Smith International. DFID is both its 
founder and major contributor. See www.stabilityfund.so.
42 United States Agency for International Development, ‘Transition Initiatives for 
Stabilization (TIS)’, factsheet, Washington, DC: United States Agency for International 
Development, 2014. The US embassy in Nairobi also funds the stabilization unit 
within the Somali Ministry of Interior and Federalism and other activities such as the 
rehabilitation of al-Shabaab defectors, dispute resolution, community development 
projects, local governance and youth employment. Source: Interview with TIS 
representative, Nairobi, 10 July 2015.
43 ‘Quick Impact Projects’, AMISOM. Accessed 28 February 2016, http://amisom-au.org/
quick-impact-projects/.
44 The same applies to most aid programmes in Somalia.
45 An interlocutor describes stabilization in Somalia as ‘stability on the cheap’, 
referring to many programmes as ‘half-baked interventions’. Source: Interview with an 
implementing partner official of the US embassy’s stabilization programme, Nairobi,  
20 July 2015.
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Stabilization as a global policy paradigm 
Efforts to stabilize south-central Somalia with a combination of 
counter-insurgency and short-term development interventions must be 
understood within the broader context in which stabilization emerged as 
a global policy paradigm. Since 2001, the United States, the UK and the 
UN have been at the forefront of developing and implementing stabiliza-
tion policies in response to security crises in Afghanistan, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Iraq and Somalia.46 The term ‘stabilization’ may 
be described as ‘a combination of military, political, development and 
humanitarian resources’ that seeks to ‘mitigate perceived security threats 
posed by weak and fragile states’ such as Somalia.47 The adoption of 
integrated approaches and the combination of civil and military elements 
are often described as characteristic of ‘stabilization thinking’.48 
Real-life stabilization programmes range from more conserva-
tive security interventions targeting terrorist and insurgent groups or 
aiming to curb illicit flows of goods and people to those with poten-
tially transformative goals that include peacebuilding, reconstruction 
and development.49 Moreover, it has proven notoriously difficult to 
pinpoint what stabilization is—and is not—as the ‘concept itself remains 
the subject of explicit and implicit contestation’.50 While stabilization 
appears as self-explanatory, what its actual goals, methods and practices 
46 See J. Bachmann, ‘Policing Africa: the US military and visions of crafting “good 
order”’, Security Dialogue 45/2 (2014), 119–36; D. Balthasar, ‘Somaliland’s best kept secret: 
shrewd politics and war projects as means of state-making’, Journal of Eastern African 
Studies 7/2 (2013), 218–38; S. Barakat et al., ‘“A tradition of forgetting”: stabilisation 
and humanitarian action in historical perspective’, Disasters 34/3 (2010), 297–319; and 
Schouten and Bachmann, Mapping Stabilization. 
47 S. Collinson et al., ‘States of fragility: stabilisation and its implications for 
humanitarian action’, Disasters 34/3 (2010), 275−96 (281, 276).
48 R. Muggah, introduction to Stabilization Operations, Security and Development: States of 
Fragility, ed. R. Muggah, London: Routledge, 2014. 
49 Collinson et al., ‘States of fragility’, 276–78. The objective of stabilization is, of course, 
stability, a goal that again amalgamates a broad variety of different policy interventions—
from counter-insurgency to good governance and improvement of the target population’s 
general well-being.
50 Barakat et al., ‘A tradition of forgetting’, 298. 
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consist of is often vague. This is also the case with current stabilization 
efforts in Somalia. In other words, who or what is to be stabilized, what 
is stability and how can it be achieved or measured remain unclear.
The harshest critique of stabilization to date likens it to an ‘essentially 
… conservative doctrine that lowers the horizons of peace and normalises 
a military role in peace-support operations’.51 A cross-comparison of 
historical stabilization programmes finds no evidence that security is 
enhanced by the combination of military and development interven-
tions.52 Along with academics, practitioners agree that stabilization 
‘although clearly defined in … handbooks and mission statements, has 
been vaguely conceptualised’.53 Among some aid officials working in and 
on Somalia, confusion reigns as to the exact meaning of stabilization. For 
instance, a coordinator working for a Somali peacebuilding NGO admitted 
that ‘we really don’t understand much of the stabilization strategies that 
are being employed’ and ‘most of the interventions like stabilization 
are only understood by the donors’.54 Stabilization discourse thus falls 
into the category of buzzwords in international development, such as 
‘participation’, ‘empowerment’, ‘resilience’, ‘sustainable development’ 
or ‘rights-based approach’.55 As a buzzword, the term ‘stabilization’ is 
intuitively understandable and has a seemingly uncontested norma-
tive goal but it covers so many potential activities that it allows almost 
everyone to be involved in stabilization, ultimately rendering it apolitical 
51 R. Mac Ginty, ‘Against stabilisation’, Stability, 1/1 (2012), 20–30 (28).
52 Barakat et al., ‘A tradition of forgetting’, 314. 
53 W. Carter, ‘War, peace and stabilisation: critically reconceptualising stability in 
Southern Afghanistan’, Stability 2/1 (2013), Art. 15, 1–20 (1).
54 Interview with a coordinator for a local peacebuilding NGO, Nairobi, 10 August 2015. 
Similar sentiments were also expressed by participants at a conference on stabilization in 
East Africa, held by the Rift Valley Institute in March 2014.
55 A. Cornwall and K. Brock, ‘What do buzzwords do for development policy? A critical 
look at “participation”, “empowerment” and “poverty reduction”’, Third World Quarterly 
26/7 (2005), 1043–60.
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and meaningless.56 Consequently, stabilization is ‘as much a form of 
branding’ as ‘a distinctive process’.57 
In lieu of a concise definition of stabilization, this particular type 
of external intervention may be understood along the lines of three of 
its fundamental characteristics. Firstly, stabilization in Somalia—and 
elsewhere—represents the present day donor response to failed states 
and their accompanying ‘insecurity-underdevelopment problematic’.58 
Secondly, stabilization as a practice is not entirely new but echoes 
coercive colonial and postcolonial counter-insurgency and pacification 
tactics, which in their contemporary form—as stabilization—bring 
together civil and military efforts and thus involve a greater number of 
actors, including, sometimes, private security companies.59 In essence, 
stabilization is ‘about powerful states seeking to forge, secure or support 
a particular political order, in line with their particular strategic objec-
tives’.60 Thirdly, stabilization is a fundamentally state-centred intention 
that goes hand in hand with statebuilding, as it seeks to eliminate violent 
competitors to the central state while increasing the loyalty to the state 
of populations living in contested territories. In Somalia, as in Afghani-
stan, stabilization that serves the purpose of statebuilding ‘essentially 
entails centralising power away from its current de facto and fragmented 
distribution across regional and local powerbrokers to a “formal” state 
governance system’.61 
56 An official from the SSF describes stabilization as ‘a buzzword that is being constantly 
used to refer to the work being done in Somalia’. Interview with SSF official, Nairobi,  
6 August 2015.
57 Barakat et al., ‘A tradition of forgetting’, 298. 
58 Carter, ‘War, peace and stabilisation’, 7.
59 Barakat et al., ‘A tradition of forgetting’. Barakat et al. also point out that stabilization 
rests on a key assumption; that is, a government that can control its territory and 
contribute to the fulfilment of basic human needs—such as education, food, health care, 
shelter and water—has the capacity to gain popular support and hence discourage or 
defeat counter-insurgent actors. 
60 Collinson et al., ‘States of fragility’, 280.
61 Carter, ‘War, peace and stabilisation’, 13.
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Paradoxes of past statebuilding in Somalia
While stabilization is a relatively new policy concept, its objective and 
modalities are reminiscent of past international statebuilding efforts in 
Somalia. Current attempts to rebuild a Somali state can thus be gauged 
on the basis of past experiences with similar exercises. The political 
literature on stateless Somalia provides important insights into recur-
rent paradoxes of statebuilding, which can be summarized under three 
broad headings. A first and major finding of the area studies literature 
pertains to the unintentional consequences of external stabilization and 
statebuilding in post-1991 Somalia. Analysts agree that efforts by the 
international community to either initiate or support the restor ation of 
a centralized government in (south-central) Somalia have either sparked 
more conflict or have proven ineffectual. Already during the UNOSOM 
(United Nations Operations in Somalia) period that began in 1992, 
centralized government was ‘the very thing that many Somalis have 
been fighting against’.62 While state restoration in Somalia was both ‘an 
apparent solution to the crisis and its most obvious underlying cause’, 
‘externally driven stabilization efforts may in fact play in [sic] the prolon-
gation and exacerbation of the conflict—especially where they aspire to 
disarmament and demobilisation’.63 A central problem in contemporary 
Somalia is ‘the persistent international effort to re-establish a govern-
ment based on external rents’.64 In short, ‘formal state structures have 
rarely been effective in independent Somalia’.65 Moreover, ‘the fixation 
of the international community on state governance has inhibited the 
development of other, more feasible, forms of governance’.66 Somalia may 
62 M. Bradbury, The Somali Conflict. Prospects for Peace, Oxford: Oxfam UK, 1994, 4.
63 M. Bryden and J. Brickhill, ‘Disarming Somalia: lessons in stabilisation from a 
collapsed state’, Conflict, Security & Development 10/2 (2010), 239–62 (240).
64 de Waal, Real Politics of the Horn of Africa, 110.
65 K. Menkhaus, ‘Somalia and the Horn of Africa’, background case study, World 
Development Report 2011, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011, 11.
66 D. K. Leonard, with M. S. Samantar, ‘What does the Somali experience teach us about 
the social contract and the state?’, Development and Change 42/(2 (2011), 559–84 (561).
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be seen as a paradigmatic case study of ‘how large-scale international 
intervention … perpetuates state failure’.67 In sum, foreign intervention 
in Somalia has been as much a part of the problem as it has been a part 
of the solution.68
A second insight concerns the significant role of foreign resources 
and aid flows in Somalia’s postcolonial history, particularly after 1969. 
The Siyad Barre government was a major recipient of both military and 
humanitarian aid.69 By the mid-1980s, foreign aid accounted for 58 per 
cent of Somali Gross National Product (GNP) while, by 1987, more than 
70 per cent of government expenditure was funded by foreign aid.70 
Although bilateral foreign aid came to a halt with the collapse of the 
Siyad Barre regime in January 1991, external resources continued to flow 
into the country, first in the form of relief aid, and later as part of military, 
diplomatic and development programmes.71 For instance, between 2000 
and 2008 Somalia ranked ‘among the top recipients of humanitarian 
aid and has been the subject of eight CAPs [UN Consolidated Appeals 
Process], more than any other country’.72 Humanitarian aid in Somalia 
‘is the story of how external resources have been used as one of the 
67 A. Ahmad, ‘Agenda for peace or budget for war? Evaluating the economic impact of 
international intervention in Somalia’, International Journal, Spring (2012), 313–31 (314). 
68 Some Somali intellectuals are deeply skeptical of these findings, which they perceive 
as yet another postcolonial enterprise that aims to consign Somalia to a permanently 
weak status.
69 O. Mehmet, ‘Effectiveness of foreign aid—the case of Somalia’, Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 9/1 (1971), 31–47.
70 P. T. Leeson, ‘Better off stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse’, 
Journal of Comparative Economics 36/4 (2007), 689–710, citing United Nations Development 
Programme, National Human Development Report Somalia 1998, New York: United Nations 
Development Programme, 1998, 57; and J. Mubarak, From Bad Policy to Chaos: How an 
Economy Fell Apart, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996.
71 The UN spent USD 1.68 billion for UNOSOM I and II while US expenditure for 
UNITAF totaled USD 2.2 billion. Source: Ahmad, ‘Agenda for peace or budget for war?’, 
315.
72 M. Bradbury, State-building, Counterterrorism, and Licensing Humanitarianism in Somalia, 
Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center, 2010, 14.
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primary economic and political prizes in a resource-scarce country’.73 
Because of this longstanding history of resource inflows, Somali political 
and economic elites have employed numerous strategies of extraver-
sion centred on the appropriation of external rents and resources. The 
constant inflow of resources as part of stabilization and statebuilding 
interventions has generated an incentive structure that motivates elites 
to fashion their rhetoric and actions in response to it. 
The appropriation of external resources is not a purely material or 
monetary process but also involves the spread and adoption of particular 
discourses—for example, on federalism, democracy and counter-terrorism. 
More importantly, resource allocation to and competition among Somali 
groups reflects acts of selective recognition by which external actors—
whether an aid agency or a foreign government—formalize their working 
relationship with a particular Somali constituency, such as a government, 
a clan militia or a local NGO.74 Processes of recognition and exclusion are 
thus at the heart of extraversion strategies in post-1991 Somalia as local 
elites vie for greater recognition and, ultimately, more resources from 
external actors. Somali elites both in the country and the diaspora are 
not simply passive victims of state collapse but have actively mobilized 
outside resources that are part of the political economy of statebuilding. 
In other words, they have made their dependence productive by appropri-
ating external resources and adopting discourses that are part of external 
state reconstruction efforts.
The third finding of existing political analysis of Somalia concerns the 
multitude of actors and relationships—local, foreign and transnational—
that characterize Somali politics. Stabilization is thus not limited to, 
for example, Western donors and local Somali communities or a partic-
ular Somali sub-national administration, but it occurs within a global 
73 L. Hammond and H. Vaughan-Lee, ‘Humanitarian Space in Somalia: a scarce 
commodity’, Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper, London: Humanitarian Policy 
Group, Overseas Development Institute, 2012, 14.
74 With regard to how this works in relation to the economy, see P. D. Little, Somalia: 
Economy without State, Bloomington and Oxford: Indiana University Press and James 
Currey, 2003, 167.
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network of relations that includes the Somali diaspora, African troops, 
foreign donors and local NGOs. The transnational character of the Somali 
conflict thus brings into interaction a broad range of Somali interest 
groups and regional countries—not just Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, 
Sudan, Uganda and Burundi but also Arab Gulf States, the United 
States, various European countries and new donors such as Turkey. These 
interactions are not only present in a regional conflict system but they 
translate into a complex and constantly evolving network of relations of 
both dependence and domination that connect Somali and non-Somali 
actors. Consequently, strategies of extraversion—the conversion of 
dependence into resources and authority—occur not only in a bilateral 
fashion but all along the different links in this network. Political settle-
ments in Somalia thus reflect the often competing alliances, agendas and 
actors that confront each other in what amounts to a transnational but 
fragmented network of statebuilders in Somalia.
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3. Selected political elites and 
settlements
As external stabilization and local extraversion proceed in Somalia, who 
are the elites that take part in the constantly evolving political settle-
ments? Political analysis is often focused on male-dominated elite politics 
in Somalia, in particular governments, donors, clan leaders, politicians 
and traditional authorities. But the term ‘elite’ is frequently used without 
a proper theory or deeper understanding of the multiple processes behind 
the formation of particular social, cultural, economic or political elites. 
During the colonial period, elite status was predominantly achieved in 
the sphere of administration, where one could obtain prestige, power 
and wealth.75 After independence, a small urban bourgeoisie emerged 
in parallel with the expansion of the Somali state.76 The increasing 
commodification of the pastoral economy was a major driver of social 
stratification and the emergence of merchant capital.77 Elite formation 
is thus a long-term process that started before the civil war but was 
strongly transformed and reconfigured by the war.78 It is also a distinctly 
urban phenomenon that, again, is linked to global networks of trade and 
aid but also to the flow of ideas, education and diaspora experiences.79
75 A. A. Castagno, ‘The Somali Republic’, in Political Parties and National Integration in 
Tropical Africa, eds. J. Coleman and C. Rosberg, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1964. 
76 R. Marchal, ‘The Post Civil War Somali Business Class’, Nairobi: European 
Commission/Somalia Unit, 1996.
77 Samatar (1992, 1987) draws on pre-war empirical material to make this argument; see 
A. I. Samatar, ‘Merchant capital, international livestock trade and pastoral development 
in Somalia’, Canadian Journal of African Studies 21/3 (1987), 355–74 and ‘Social classes and 
economic restructuring in pastoral Africa: Somali notes’, African Studies Review 35/1 (1992), 
101–27.
78 Marchal, ‘Somali Business Class’.
79 For instance, ‘more than 60 percent of the country’s foreign aid in the 1980s ended 
up in Mogadishu’ and that by 1990 ‘up to 95 percent of the country’s negotiable assets 
[were] controlled by residents of Mogadishu’. Source: Little, Economy without State, 47. 
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Elites are conventionally identified by reference to their superior 
economic, political and symbolic capital.80 In particular, an elite is ‘a 
relatively small group within the societal hierarchy that claims and/or 
is accorded power, prestige, or command over others’.81 Possession of 
fixed and mobile resources, political clout and cultural distinction are 
key indicators for determining who belongs to the dominant social strata. 
These indicators can be measured empirically if the required statistical 
and survey data are available. In the case of Somalia, however, such data 
have been lacking for the past quarter century. Important questions 
with regard to the nature of political and other elites in contemporary 
Somalia thus remain partly unanswered. For instance, who is part of the 
elite? Who partakes in elite bargains that shape political settlements? 
What is the longevity of a particular elite individual or group? And what 
does it take to be a member of the elite, however defined, in Somalia 
today? This is likely to differ from place to place. As Somali society 
experienced war-induced localization, privatization and globalization,82 
so local governance arrangements have involved different sets of local, 
national and international actors and coalitions in different localities.83
This then raises a new set of questions. If for instance elders, religious 
leaders, neighbourhood associations, NGOs, diaspora returnees and 
security forces, including al-Shabaab, shoulder the everyday governance 
of a town or region, can they then be labeled as local elites? Or are 
they instead elites of their respective clan lineage? Or maybe they are 
80 P. Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, London: Routledge, 
1984. 
81 T. Salverda and J. Abbink, ‘Introduction: an anthropological perspective on elite 
power and the cultural politics of elites’, in The Anthropology of Elites: Power, Culture, and the 
Complexities of Distinction, eds. J. Abbink and T. Salverda, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012, 1.
82 United Nations Development Programme, National Human Development Report Somalia 
2001, New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2001. 
83 Menkhaus, K. ‘Governance without government in Somalia: spoilers, state building, 
and the politics of coping’, International Security 31/3 (2007b), 74–106. While it is often 
argued that clan or clan elders are the primary guardians of local peace and security in 
rural Somalia, clan designations hide the fact that members of the same lineage may 
differ dramatically in terms of capital, education, gender, age or locality.
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simply a pillar of the local political settlement without having real elite 
status? Such questions suggest that in a place such as Somalia where 
no national statistics exist, where mobility, displacement and political 
flux are recurrent and where genealogy constantly blurs and hides other 
social markers, the identification of local elites is difficult. While turbu-
lent political settlements have frequently led to changes in political 
leadership—for instance, the dismissal and nomination of prime minis-
ters—some influential politicians and warlords have managed to recycle 
themselves.84 Adjectives such as ‘local’, ‘national’, ‘political’, ‘economic’ 
or ‘religious’ all need to be lightly weighted when ascribing elite status 
to any particular actor. Furthermore, Somali elites often wear multiple 
hats—as elders, businesspeople, politicians, civil society leaders and so 
on. In spite of these disclaimers, the following functional elite groups 
are frequently mentioned in the literature.85
Warlords 
Leaders of armed clan-based factions in south-central Somalia—particu-
larly in the 1990s—have commonly been referred to as ‘warlords’. Media 
and popular accounts portray them as the politico-military elites that 
ruined Somalia, after Siyad Barre’s defeat and the United Somali Congress 
fell apart, and their militias embarked on a looting spree targeting other 
clans and international organizations alike.86 Despite its popularity, 
the warlord label is misleading as it glosses over important differences 
between, on the one hand, faction leaders who once were ‘political 
84 P. Chabal and J-P. Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument, Bloomington and 
Oxford: Indiana University Press and James Currey, 1999, chapter 3. Examples of recycled 
politicians are: Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, former speaker of parliament and since 2014 
president of South West State; Ali Khalif Galaydh, former prime minister in the TNG 
and now president of Khatumo state; and Muhammed Ibrahim Egal, prime minister of 
independent Somalia and later on second president of the Somaliland Republic.
85 Other important elite groups that shape political settlements are civil society leaders, 
politicians and Islamists, discussed in detail below. A more thorough review and 
discussion of the role of specific sub-national elites in the various federal states is beyond 
the scope of this report.
86 L. Kapteijns, Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991, Philadelphia: 
Pennsylvania University Press, 2013.
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leaders with large constituencies’ and, on the other hand, those who 
were ‘defecting military commanders with no political background’.87 As 
violent entrepreneurs operating in a ‘market of violence’,88 they oversaw 
militias that looted private and public property, operated protection 
rackets and checkpoints, forced the business community to pay them and 
provided security to visitors, including humanitarian agencies.89 Warlords 
recruited and paid fighters from their own or closely related clan lineages. 
At times they ‘emerged as the means by which a group of interests (often 
rallying behind the name of a clan) could make a point, get recognition 
from the international community (always in need of interlocutors), or 
show autonomy or resistance towards another warlord’.90
The trajectory of Mogadishu-based warlords evolved from protectors of 
clan interests91 to predators of weaker clan groups and security providers 
for businesses. Although they were and are well known, none of the 
warlords faced legal persecution in or outside of Somalia for the atroci-
ties committed by their militias. To the contrary, up to the mid-2000s, 
external stabilization interventions sought to co-opt them into power-
sharing agreements and transitional governments. Already at the end 
of United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), the UN had 
tried to appease some warlords through hand-outs and other favours.92 
87 R. Marchal, ‘Warlordism and terrorism: how to obscure an already confusing crisis? 
The case of Somalia’, International Affairs 83/6 (2007), 1091–106 (1093).
88 G. Elwert, ‘Markets of violence’, in Dynamics of Violence. Processes of Escalation and De-
escalation in Violent Group Conflicts, eds. G. Elwert et al., Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1997.
89 R. Marchal, ‘Les mooryaan de Mogadiscio. Formes de la violence dans un espace 
urbain en guerre’, Cahiers d’Etudes africaines XXXIII/2 (1993), 295–320 and A. Ahmad, ‘The 
security bazaar: business interests and Islamist power in civil war Somalia’, International 
Security 39/3 (2014), 89–117.
90 Marchal, ‘Warlordism’, 1099. Warlords such as Ahmed Omar Jess or General 
Mohamed Said Hersi Morgan ‘manipulated and aggravated’ clan rivalries. Source: Little, 
Economy without State, 57.
91 I. M. Lewis explains that in Mogadishu in the early 1990s ‘only those who belonged 
to strong clans and lineages could protect their lives and property successfully’. Source: 
I. M. Lewis, A Modern History of the Somali: nation and state in the Horn of Africa, Oxford, 
Hargeisa and Athens: James Currey, Btec Books and Ohio University Press, 2002, 279.
92 Lewis, Modern History, 275.
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In reality, the military clout of warlords has eroded since the mid-1990s 
as their fiefdoms decreased in size because clan factions ‘fragmented 
into smaller and smaller parts’.93 While the Arta peace and reconcili ation 
conference that led to the Somali Transitional National Government 
(TNG) in 2000 excluded warlords, the subsequent Eldoret–Mbagathi 
process recycled several warlords as members of parliaments and cabinet 
ministers.94 The political settlement that emerged during this time was 
one in which warlords ‘straddl[ed] … political and economic positions’ 
and at the same time managed to extort resources from foreign donors.95 
The alliance between warlords and business was based on protection 
and taxation. It lasted for about a decade until major Somali business 
companies either took security into their own hands or contracted local 
Shari’a courts for security provision. This compact between warlords 
and influential businessmen lay at the core of Mogadishu’s political 
settlements in the 1990s. It explains why beneficiaries of the war 
economy—warlords who were able to provide protection in exchange 
for taxes—had little interest in the revival of central state institutions.96 
As interviews with dozens of elite business community members and 
warlords active during UNOSOM reveal, ‘virtually all of the biggest 
businesspeople in Mogadishu made their first fortunes from inter-
national aid contracts during the UNOSOM mission’.97 Because they 
paid off warlords, they were able to transport relief aid across insecure 
territories without risking their goods. Extraversion—the presence and 
93 S. J. Hansen, ‘Civil War Economies, the Hunt for Profit and the Incentives for 
Peace: the case of Somalia’, AE Working paper no. 1, Department of Economics and 
International Development, University of Bath, 2007, 48. 
94 For instance, Osman Hassan Ali ‘Atto’, a businessperson and former financier of 
Aideed, who later became his opponent and then joined the TFG. See C. Webersik, 
‘Mogadishu: an economy without a state’, Third World Quarterly 27/8 (2006), 1463–80 
(1470).
95 R. Marchal, ‘A few provocative remarks on governance in Somalia’, Nairobi: United 
Nations Development Office for Somalia (UNDOS), 1998, 3.
96 K. Menkhaus, ‘State collapse in Somalia: second thoughts’, Review of African Political 
Economy 39/97 (2003), 405–22 and C. Webersik, ‘Fighting for the plenty: the banana trade 
in Southern Somalia’, Oxford Development Studies 33/1 (2005), 81–97 (95).
97 Ahmad, ‘Agenda for peace or budget for war?’, 323. 
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appropriation of foreign aid—was crucial in the emergence of ‘a marriage 
of convenience between warlords and the new business elite’ and this 
‘elite pact continued long after UNOSOM and has kept Somalia in a state 
of perpetual failure’.98 While warlords no longer dominate Somalia’s 
political settlement as they did in the 1990s, they nonetheless shaped 
elite bargains in ways that continue to be effective today.99 
Business class
State collapse triggered the emergence of a private business class that 
has subsequently asserted itself as a dominant political force in political 
settlements in all parts of Somalia.100 The privatization of goods and 
services, as well as the absence of public tariffs and taxes, gave rise to 
risky but profitable business opportunities for importers, investors and—
later on—producers of consumer goods.101 The net result was capital 
accumulation in the hands of a few very influential businesspeople 
and companies that have a dominant market share. In the early 1990s, 
the export of primary goods such as livestock, bananas and charcoal 
grew significantly.102 In return, businesspeople imported consumer 
goods, including textiles, sugar and cigarettes but also khat—a mildly 
narcotic plant—and weapons.103 When the war in south-central Somalia 
de-escalated in the mid-1990s, major financial companies from other 
regions started to invest or reinvest in Mogadishu, collaborating with 
98 Ahmad, ‘Agenda for peace or budget for war?’, 326. As proof of her argument, she also 
cites the fact that southern Somalia’s major food aid contractors in 2009 had all made 
their fortune in the early 1990s through ‘elite-level security arrangements with local 
warlords’. Source: Ahmad, ‘Agenda for peace or budget for war?’, 323.
99 For example, see United Nations, Security Council, ‘Report of the Monitoring Group 
on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1853 (2008)’, New York: United 
Nations Security Council, 2010.
100 For an in-depth account of this development, see Marchal, ‘Somali Business Class’ 
and R. Marchal, ‘A Survey of Mogadishu’s Economy’, Nairobi: European Commission/
Somalia Unit, 2002.
101 Marchal, ‘Somali Business Class’.
102 Hansen, ‘Civil War Economies’, 58.
103 Webersik, ‘Economy without a state’.
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warlords to ensure the protection of their property.104 Between the middle 
and the end of the 1990s, many businesses re-established themselves in 
Mogadishu, changing the structure of their businesses.105 This period 
saw the establishment of more advanced sectors, including the spread 
of telecommunication companies and the opening of small factories.106 
To pursue business across clan fiefdoms and political boundaries, many 
businesspeople adopted shareholder-based companies drawing on 
religious and old student networks, creating ‘a potential for expansion 
beyond areas dominated by a single clan’.107 The globalization of the 
Somali diaspora—and henceforth of Somali capital—aided the rise of 
business, with Mogadishu, Dubai and Nairobi acting as major hubs.108 
Politically, the elite stratum of Somali business owners gradually 
emancipated itself from the clan politicians and warlords who had 
dominated the political settlement in the 1990s. While at first business-
people financed armed factions in return for protection,109 they began to 
fund their own security forces and, later on, turned to local Shari’a courts 
for protection.110 This allowed them to reduce security expenses, which 
had diminished profitability. By 1999, the ‘business class had become an 
independent political force’ as leading businesspeople stopped paying 
104 Marchal, ‘Survey of Mogadishu’s Economy’.
105 Hansen, ‘Civil War Economies’, 53.
106 Hansen, ‘Civil War Economies’, 53.
107 Hansen, ‘Civil War Economies’, 55.
108 N. Carrier and E. Lochery, ‘Missing states? Somali trade networks and the 
Eastleigh transformation’, Journal of Eastern African Studies 7/2 (2013), 334–52 and P. D. 
Little, Economic and Political Reform in Africa: Anthropological Perspectives, Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2014.
109 Hansen’s account of the Mogadishu business class in the early 1990s differs starkly 
from Ahmad’s findings. While Ahmad describes a private sector that benefited from 
political turmoil due to the above-mentioned alliance with the warlords, Hansen 
highlights how most businesses lost property and financial capital between 1991 and 
1993. See, respectively: Hansen, ‘Civil War Economies’ and Ahmad, ‘Agenda for peace or 
budget for war?’ 
110 Hansen, ‘Civil War Economies’ and Ahmad, ‘The security bazaar’. 
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protection money to militia leaders of their clans.111 Many of these 
Mogadishu-based businesspeople played prominent roles in the Arta 
peace conference, the subsequent formation of the TNG and, later on, 
in support of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU).112 While the relationship 
between the business elite and violent entrepreneurs, as well as the 
nature of Somali business, changed over time, the partnership with inter-
national aid agencies that continue to sub-contract goods and services to 
major Somali companies has remained constant—albeit with fluctuating 
levels of contracts and financial transactions.
The political position of the rising Somali business class towards state-
building has thus evolved considerably over time. Earlier on, critics had 
pointed out that ‘the scrap merchants’ could only lose from a peaceful 
political settlement113 and consequently ‘actively promoted’ a ‘protracted 
state collapse’ that ‘serves [their] interests and objectives’.114 Business 
owners also suffered from insecurity—particularly theft—and success-
fully embraced legitimate business activities. They thus do not reject the 
rebuilding of a Somali state altogether115 but rather seek, as is currently 
the case in Somaliland, to limit its authority by ‘block[ing] higher 
taxes and greater regulation’116 that threaten to diminish their profits. 
Moreover, the creation of effective multi-clan shareholder companies that 
allowed the private sector to overcome clan and territorial fragmentation 
offers important lessons for statebuilding which are not primarily based 
on extraversion but on cooperation and mutual benefits.117 
111 International Crisis Group, ‘Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State’, Africa 
Report no. 45, Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 23 May 2002, 3. Also see 
Menkhaus, ‘State collapse in Somalia’, 417, who writes, ‘They bought the militiamen 
away from the warlords, and sub-contracted out management of the militia to sharia 
courts.’
112 See Webersik, ‘Economy without a state’.
113 Lewis, Modern History, 308.
114 Menkhaus, ‘State collapse’, 406, 414.
115 Hansen, ‘Civil War Economies’.
116 International Crisis Group, ‘Strains of Success’.
117 See E. Lochery, ‘Generating Power: Electricity Provision and State Formation in 
Somaliland’, PhD thesis, University of Oxford, 2015.
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Donors
Because of their prominent and longstanding role in funding and directing 
humanitarian, development and reconstruction aid in Somalia, donors 
have both shaped and partaken in elite bargains in Somalia. This has 
occurred in spite of the typically short periods of expatriate postings in 
diplomatic missions, international organizations or NGOs. Managing 
and attempting to control resources has positioned them as impor-
tant intermediaries between Somali elites and the broader world, as 
they ‘negotiate the links between broader international dynamics and 
local context’.118 Much of this intermediation occurs through processes 
and relations of sub-contracting by which local actors—NGOs, private 
companies and public administrations—implement aid programmes. 
With the rise of the stabilization agenda, aid has increasingly been 
channeled through multi-donor funding mechanisms like the SSF or 
the Somali Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF).119 Despite 
commitments to participation, partnership and empowerment ‘relations 
between donors, international NGOs, and local civil society remain 
asymmetrical and strained’.120 Somalia’s donors are not a homogenous 
group but marked by competition and conflicts of interest. While the 
UN was the most prominent funder in the early 1990s, the EU—then the 
European Commission—played a prominent role in directing aid policy 
in Somalia from the mid-1990s onwards.121 Following a phase of relative 
withdrawal between the end of the 1990s and the mid-2000s, the UN, 
the United States and various European donor agencies increased their 
assistance to Somalia again after 2010. 
118 A. Schmidt, ‘Coordinating development in conflict states: donor networks in 
Somalia’, IDS Bulletin 44/1 (2013), 54–71 (59).
119 With the exception of Turkey and the Gulf States, donors have been reluctant to 
directly fund the Somali government’s treasury. Turkey became an influential donor after 
the 2011 famine.
120 K. Menkhaus et al., ‘Somalia: civil society in a collapsed state’, in Civil Society and 
Peacebuilding: a critical assessment, ed. T. Paffenholz, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2010, 333–34.
121 Bradbury, State-building, 4.
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Increased aid levels following the formation of the FGS have accentu-
ated relations of dependence but also highlighted practices of extraversion 
between Nairobi-based agencies and local implementers.122 They have also 
raised concerns that externally funded institution-building in Somalia is 
overly dirigiste (directed by a central authority) because it is dominated by 
international aid agencies and donors.123 The establishment of the SDRF in 
November 2013—the main financing mechanism for the Somali Compact—
occurred with little input from Somali actors.124 The elite alliance between 
donors and the FGS that informs the New Deal, the Somali Compact and 
the SDRF have led to criticism among some aid professionals. Asked about 
the New Deal, a stabilization advisor remarks on the exclusion of societal 
actors from current statebuilding in the country: ‘The deal is supposed to 
[involve] the government, the donors and civil society. But in Somalia, the 
only partners are the government and the donors.’125 Another aid official 
describes how the New Deal connected particular donors to particular 
Somali government officials and local NGOs, giving way to a ‘powerful elite 
group that has monopolized implementation’.126 Many Somalis perceive 
these connections between donors and particular groups in the light of clan 
politics; that is, as a preferential relationship between particular donors and 
particular clan lineages. With regard to current stabilization programmes 
in Somalia, a UN worker observes that decision-making power not only 
lies with local Somali elites ‘but within NGO elite circles where jobs and 
opportunities circulate amongst themselves’.127 
122 Sub-contracting entails complicated power relations between donor and local NGOs 
because the latter enjoy considerable autonomy in a situation of ‘remote management’. 
Source: Hammond and Vaughan-Lee, ‘Humanitarian Space’, 12.
123 K. Menkhaus, ‘Aid and Institution-building in Fragile States: the case of Somali-
inhabited eastern Horn of Africa’, WIDER working paper 2014/002, Helsinki: United 
Nations University, 2014, 8. This view is contested by observers who insist that donor 
coherence towards Somalia remains very limited, giving Somalis room for manoeuver to 
pursue their own interests and projects.
124 Schmidt, ‘Coordinating development’, 61.
125 Interview with stabilization advisor, Nairobi, 8 August 2015.
126 Interview with stabilization official, Nairobi, 6 August 2015.
127 Interview with UN staff member, Nairobi, 21 August 2015.
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4. Somali statebuilding by extraversion
This section highlights recurrent modes of extraversion at the nexus 
between local Somali political settlements and international stabilization 
attempts, using Bayart’s six modes of extraversion—coercion, trickery, 
flight, intermediation, appropriation and rejection.128 Two clarifications 
should be borne in mind. First, these modes of extraversion are not 
mutually exclusive but may draw on other modes or combine. Second, 
extraversion modes are not equally distributed through time. They have 
a life of their own. Some are more durable than others and some are 
more prominent at particular times and in particular places. Nonetheless, 
it is possible to pinpoint persistent extraversion mechanisms for each 
of these six modes in order to highlight which among them have been 
particularly powerful in shaping political settlements.
Coercion
Coercion has been a staple extraversion strategy for powerful Somali 
elites with a stake in internationalized forms of statebuilding. It may 
be seen as an integral part of political life in post-colonial Africa and 
as a ‘means of regulating the imported state and of laying hold of its 
resources’.129 Siyad Barre’s aid-dependent administration relied on 
an oppressive security apparatus—initially established with support 
from the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic—using 
the national army and the infamous National Security Service to crack 
down on domestic political opposition, namely the Majerteen (1979–1981) 
and the Issaq (1981–1991) rebellions in the north-east and north-west 
respectively.130 With the disintegration of the central state, the power 
of coercion was no longer restricted to a government. Instead it spread 
128 Bayart, ‘History of extraversion’, 254–55. 
129 Bayart, ‘History of extraversion’, 258.
130 J. Bakonyi, ‘Moral economies of mass violence: Somalia 1988–1991’, Civil Wars 11/4 
(2009), 434–54 and Human Rights Watch, ‘Somalia: A Government at War With its Own 
People’, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 1990.
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among clan-based armed groups of variable size, durability and ability 
to generate revenue or hold territory. Among south-central Somalia’s 
factions, military strength allowed them to defend clan interests and to 
appropriate resources through taxation, looting and violence. Signifi-
cantly, this in turn increased the likelihood of their being included in 
the repeated ceasefire agreements, reconciliation conferences and peace 
accords brokered by the UN, the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) and regional countries between the early 1990s 
and 2009.131 In these crucial moments of internationally sponsored peace-
making, coercion guaranteed armed factions access to a future political 
settlement which was supposed to revive state authority.
More importantly, external stabilization policies have repeatedly 
involved arming and training of Somali groups as part of proxy warfare, 
counterterrorism or centralized statebuilding, aided by international 
military missions.132 Time and again, Somali political groups have 
managed to garner foreign military assistance in pursuit of their political 
projects. To cite a few examples: Ali Mahdi was supported by UN troops 
in his power struggle against Mohammed Farah Aideed (1993); Ethiopia133 
backed the Rahanweyn Resistance Army militarily in Bay and Bakool 
(1998–2002), along with the former Puntland and Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) president Abdullahi Yusuf (2002, 2004–2008), and 
the current FGS. In 2006, the Central Intelligence Agency funded a group 
131 For instance, examples of this include the Addis Ababa Agreement (1993), the 
Ethiopian (1996) and Egyptian (1997) peace initiatives and, later, the creation of the 
Transitional Federal Government (2002–2004 and 2009) under IGAD and UN auspices. 
For an overview of important peace conferences, see Interpeace, A History of Mediation in 
Somalia Since 1998, Nairobi: Interpeace, 2009.
132 While UNOSOM did not entertain direct military alliances with Somali politico-
military groups, its legacy in terms of contributing to coercion is highlighted by the 
conjecture that ‘UNOSOM probably left Somalia more heavily armed than it had found it’ 
after equipping and arming a Somali police force that would soon disintegrate and hand 
over ‘containers full of weapons to the faction leaders’. Source: Bryden and Brickhill, 
‘Disarming Somalia’, 255.
133 In March 2001, Ethiopia sponsored the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration 
Council, an alliance of warlords opposed to the Transitional National Government 
(TNG). Its members figured prominently in the first Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) created in November 2002. 
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of prominent Mogadishu warlords as part of covert counterterrorism 
operations against foreign al-Qaeda members and radical Islamists 
associated with the ICU.134 After 2007, AMISOM’s peacekeeping troops 
from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia and Kenya 
have carried out most of the day-to-day fighting against al-Shabaab, in 
coalition with TFG and FGS forces and allied militias.135 Over the years, 
Eritrea has supported various warlords and, later on, the ICU in its proxy 
war against Ethiopia.136 Al-Shabaab also practises military extraversion 
as foreign fighters have joined its ranks and it allied itself with al-Qaeda 
in early 2012.137 Furthermore, Islamist insurgents have purchased arms 
from Somali government forces. Recent reports controversially point 
to commercial relations between AMISOM, namely Kenyan forces, and 
al-Shabaab—centred on the charcoal and sugar trades.138 Such military 
interventions, on behalf of or in support of a particular Somali party, 
are associated with some of the most violent episodes in the post-Barre 
period.139 More often than not, coercion as a method of extraversion 
has undermined peace and statebuilding in south-central Somalia. It 
134 Menkhaus, ‘Stabilisation and humanitarian access’, 336. Also see P. J. Quaranto, 
Building States while Fighting Terror: Contradictions in United States Strategy in Somalia from 2001 
to 2007, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2008, 40–46.
135 P. Albrecht and C. Haenlein, ‘Fragmented peacebuilding: the African Union in 
Somalia’, RUSI Journal, 161/1 (2016), 50–61. Between 2012 and 2014, a contingent of 850 
Sierra Leonean troops was part of AMISOM.
136 K. Menkhaus, ‘The crisis in Somalia: tragedy in five acts’, African Affairs 106/204 
(2007a), 357–90.
137 At the end of 2015, a split occurred within al-Shabaab, with one faction pledging 
allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
138 Journalists for Justice, Black and White: Kenya’s criminal racket in Somalia, Nairobi: 
Journalists for Justice, 2015.
139 Menkhaus, ‘Stabilisation and humanitarian access’, 327. Most notably, the Ethiopian 
military campaign against the ICU was accompanied by abuses of civilians, in particular 
indiscriminate bombardments of residential areas in Mogadishu in 2007. Source: Human 
Rights Watch, ‘Shell Shocked. Civilians Under Siege in Mogadishu’, Washington, DC: 
Human Rights Watch, 2007. Up to two third of the population of Mogadishu temporarily 
fled the capital in 2007 and 2008. Source: A. Lindley, ‘Leaving Mogadishu: towards a 
sociology of conflict-related mobility’, Journal of Refugee Studies 23/1 (2010), 2–22.
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has permitted political competitors to resort to violence rather than to 
negotiate a new political settlement with their opponents.
With the decision of UN-mandated AMISOM peacekeeping force 
and Western donors to secure the survival of the TFG in 2007 and, 
after 2012, the FGS against al-Shabaab, statebuilding in south-central 
Somalia became an essentially ‘partisan project supporting one side 
of the conflict’.140 The return of international peacekeeping troops to 
Somalia in 2007 was followed by the TFG’s 2011 National Security and 
Stabilization Plan, which committed donors to backing various Somali 
state security forces, in particular the Somali Police Force (SPF)141 and the 
SNA. Since the mid-2000s, the United States has irregularly conducted 
covert operations and drone attacks on targets in south-central Somalia 
in collaboration with government intelligence officials.142 Meanwhile in 
Somaliland, donors have supported the coastguard and the counterter-
rorist Rapid Reaction Unit, a special police unit tasked with protecting 
diplomatic personnel.143 Military support to the FGS has been comple-
mented by quick-impact stabilization projects intended to increase 
popular support for the government in areas liberated from al-Shabaab.144 
140 Hammond and Vaughan-Lee, ‘Humanitarian Space’, 9. While different external 
actors supported different factions in Somalia up to the mid-2000s, after 2006 the UN 
and the international community aligned themselves more overtly with the TFG–FGS. In 
2012, the United States lifted its arms embargo in support of the current government.
141 The SPF was previously trained and funded under a UNDP programme despite its 
dismal human rights record and reputation for ineffectiveness. See A. Hills, ‘Somalia 
works: police development as statebuilding’, African Affairs 113/450 (2014), 103–104 and 
K. Menkhaus, ‘Somalia: ‘They created a desert and called it peace(building)’, Review of 
African Political Economy 36/120 (2009), 223–33 (231).
142 ‘Somalia: reported US covert actions 2001–2015’, Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 
22 February 2015. Accessed 28 February 2016, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.
com/2012/02/22/get-the-data-somalias-hidden-war/. 
143 Bryden and Brickhill, ‘Disarming Somalia’, 260. Also see L. W. Moe, ‘The 
strange wars of liberal peace: hybridity, complexity and the governing rationalities of 
counterinsurgency in Somalia’, Peacebuilding (2015), doi: 10.1080/21647259.2015.1094907 
and Schouten and Bachmann, Mapping Stabilization.
144 For a detailed breakdown of military and security assistance to various Somali 
parties, see Suri, ‘Barbed Wire on our Heads’, who indicates that between 2007 and 2015,  
the US government spent USD 1.4 billion in support of African forces fighting against  
al-Shabaab; the EU provided EUR 800 million to AMISOM in the same period.
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The key insight here is that violence has recurrently been practised and 
actively invited by Somali constituencies in defence of what has been 
referred to as the ‘imported state’.145 The TFG/FGS perfectly fits this label, 
as it was forged, with heavy external involvement, in Djibouti and Kenya 
before it moved to Mogadishu. Its survival appears to require constant 
externally funded, and often externally implemented, coercion against 
its domestic competitors, indicating a lack of domestic acceptance and 
credibility.146 This said, donors have been torn between strengthening the 
FGS’s coercive capacity and restraining it. Many Somalis on the other 
hand view the armed forces as a source of employment to be shared 
among clan lineages.
Trickery
Deception and trickery represent a second type of extraversion that 
may be described as ‘attempts to mislead the foreign master [sic], his 
representatives and indeed his successors’.147 In essence, trickery allows 
individuals and groups to make a living by circumventing the law, policies 
or rules imposed by foreign authority. While trickery might be considered 
immoral, illegal or at least informal, it also attests to the agency of local 
populations or the striving for self-improvement and a better future, as 
in the case of Somali migrants who undertake tahriib.148 State collapse has 
allowed for the proliferation of various forms of trickery and deception in 
Somalia. These include but are not limited to the importation of fake or 
expired goods, the counterfeiting of the Somali shilling, the widespread 
use of forged identity documents, diplomas and certificates, and the 
145 Bayart, ‘History of extraversion’, 258.
146 Already in 2007, the TFG was not trusted by the population nor did it represent the 
powerful interest groups in Mogadishu. Source: C. Barnes and H. Hassan, ‘The Rise and 
Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts’, Africa Programme Briefing Paper, London: Chatham 
House, 2007, 7.
147 Bayart, ‘History of extraversion’, 259.
148 The Arabic word tahriib refers to a specific form of illegal emigration involving a large 
number of young Somali men and women leaving for Europe via Ethiopia, Sudan and 
Libya, and then across the Mediterranean Sea. This word now has widespread currency in 
the contemporary Somali lexicon.
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use of false identities for obtaining asylum or residence abroad—often 
in connection with family reunion programmes. While many of these 
tactics are harmful to others, they are also practical coping mechanisms 
when the boundary between the legal-formal and the illegal-informal is 
blurred. In terms of stabilization—both in its more political variant of 
statebuilding and its more classical variant of development—trickery 
and deception have accompanied foreign interventions. Two prominent 
examples are the opportunistic creation of ‘briefcase NGOs’149 and ficti-
tious public administrations. Both reflect Somali elite preoccupation with 
attracting foreign resources and the established practice of re-hatting 
themselves in whatever form facilitates access to foreign patronage.
Fake NGOs flourished in the early 1990s during UNOSOM. The massive 
inflow of humanitarian and development aid, the absence of a govern-
mental counterpart and donor commitment to working with civil society 
incentivized some Somalis to fabricate local NGOs. These ‘frequently 
turned out to be designed simply to attract foreign money rather than to 
accomplish their declared aims’.150 Donor demands for local counterparts 
in Somalia led to ‘the rapid formation of thousands of NGOs, most of 
which only had a single member’.151 This type of deception was only 
possible because external stabilizers desperately required implementing 
partners who could absorb aid money. For example, UNOSOM has been 
criticized for ‘unintentionally distort[ing] the concept of the local NGO’, 
for ‘produc[ing] an epidemic of hundreds of bogus NGOs’ and thereby 
‘contribut[ing] to a culture of corruption and lack of accountability’.152
Corruption and different types of financial misappropriation have not 
been limited to the NGO sector in Somalia but have also been regular 
features of the various transitional governments. In many ways, they 
149 The term ‘briefcase organization’ refers to a fraudulent organization set up by 
one or two people for the sole purpose of obtaining money from donors but having no 
programmes on the ground.
150 Lewis, Modern History, 299.
151 B. Helander, ‘Is there a Civil Society in Somalia?’, Nairobi: United Nations 
Development Office for Somalia, 1998, 7.
152 Menkhaus et al., ‘Civil society in a collapsed state’, 330. 
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reflect a historic type of extraversion based on corruption and grandiose 
but ultimately unrealistic projects promoted by Italian colonialists 
between the 1930s and 1960s.153 A large informal economy already existed 
during the Siyad Barre years, ultimately contributing to state collapse, as 
people pursued business outside the heavily regulated formal economy.154 
Deception, pretension and trickery in Somalia’s development sector have 
also been aided by the fact that a large part of international aid to the 
country since 1995 is controlled remotely from Nairobi.155 As a review of 
donor networks in Somalia indicates, ‘Few donors have actually seen the 
institutions they debate, and rumours about their Potemkin-like nature 
abound (and are frequently confirmed).’156 In recent years, donors have 
sought to counter corruption and increase accountability by strength-
ening the monitoring and evaluation components of their programmes.157
Trickery has thus extended into the realm of statebuilding, more so in 
south-central Somalia than in Somaliland and Puntland. Because external 
stabilization has been state-centric, propping up weak, unpopular and 
ineffective administrations, some Somali political entrepreneurs have 
produced what may be best described as fictitious, ceremonial, theatrical 
or even counterfeit ministries and offices. They present themselves with 
official titles, organigrams and letterheads but have or have had little 
meaning or substance other than absorbing aid rents—a phenomenon 
of which donors are well aware. A telling example of this trend is the 
2005 TFG administration under then President Abdillahi Yusuf, which 
‘sported over 80 cabinet ministers, including a minister of tourism’.158 
153 G. Prunier, ‘Benign neglect versus “La grande Somalia”: the colonial legacy and the 
post-colonial Somali state’, in Milk and Peace, Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society, and 
Politics, eds. M. V. Hoehne and V. Luling, London: Hurst, 2010.  
154 Mubarak, From Bad Policy to Chaos.
155 Hammond and Vaughan-Lee, ‘Humanitarian Space’, 12.
156 Schmidt, ‘Coordinating development’, 61. The metaphor of Potemkin (or Potemkin 
village) refers to an elaborate show or construction that aims at disguising an undesirable 
fact or condition.
157 For example, DFID funds a six year accountability programme in Somalia 
(Implementation and Analysis in Action Accountability Programme).
158 Menkhaus, ‘Somalia and the Horn of Africa’, 11.
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Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed’s administration (2009–2012) continued 
this practice. A scathing analysis by the International Crisis Group 
describes the internal workings of the administration as a ‘caricature’ 
and an ‘illusion of a government’ but one that enjoyed ‘the virtually 
unqualified backing’ of the international community.159 
Most of the post-1991 Mogadishu-based governments have, to a greater 
or lesser degree, been illusory. Rather as in Hans Christian Andersen’s 
fairytale, The Emperor’s New Clothes, this type of political trickery was 
only made possible by a naïve belief in these institutions.160 This can 
be taken even further, with one review of the TFG proposing that ‘the 
international community appeared to need a revived central government 
more than the Somalis themselves’.161 Briefcase administrations also 
proliferated locally in the form of sub-national administrations, or mini-
states, that were created across the Somali territories, in particular in 
2010 and 2011. Those who established such mini-states were motivated 
by the hope that the federal government would recognize them as 
regional entities, as part of the decentralization and federalism move 
that the inter national community had prescribed to the TFG. Many of 
these mini-states possessed a very small constituency and some lacked 
even a presence on the ground.162 Like the fake local NGOs created in 
the early 1990s, these pseudo-local administrations were projects that 
lacked genuine local anchorage, political capital or significant popular 
support.163 Tellingly for the extraversion strategy that lies at the heart 
159 International Crisis Group, ‘Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support’, 
Africa Report no. 170, Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 21 February 2011, 1, 
11. President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed’s first cabinet consisted of 36 ministers and twice as 
many assistant ministers. Source: International Crisis Group, ‘Transitional Government 
on Life Support’, 2.
160 T. Hagmann and U. Terlinden, ‘Somalias fiktive Friedensprozesse: Neue 
“Briefkasten”—Regierung statt Konfliktregelung’, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 3 March 2005, 9.
161 Menkhaus, ‘Aid and Institution-building’, 8.
162 International Crisis Group, ‘Transitional Government on Life Support’, 7–8.
163 Trickery has not been limited to the executive branches of transitional governments 
but can also be seen in some of the legislatures, for example the federal parliament, 
which suffers from absenteeism. Source: ‘Somali MPs fined for absenteeism’, Shabelle 
Media, 22 December 2015.
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of these entities, many of them were announced abroad or initiated by 
diaspora groups.164
Trickery has been a recurrent feature in the formation of local and 
national administrations across the Somali territories. Essentially, it 
illustrates how Somali political entrepreneurs have made creative and 
calculated use of external stabilization funds by either pretending to rule 
or by cashing in on international recognition of the various transitional 
governments.165 External rents have thus been attracted on the basis 
of ‘legal command’166—the fact that internationally backed transitional 
governments can claim de jure authority for Somalia. Stabilization that 
involves the emergence of illusory governments does little to transform 
local political settlements. It awards those who can claim to be in office 
with rents and does occasionally allow for power-sharing and political 
inclusion. The Djibouti process in 2009 that resulted in the reformed 
TFG is an example of this. But it has failed to produce a durable political 
settlement that produces governance by local efforts rather than outside 
budgets.
Flight
Flight has been another continuing and prominent mode of extraversion 
in conflict-ravaged Somalia. It may be described as ‘a strategy which the 
weak are more or less obliged to take in the face of the strong’.167 Flight 
manifests itself in forced displacement and migration but also in more 
164 For example, this was the case with Azania state (formed in Kenya in April 2011), 
Jubaland (announced in London in March 2011), Ceelbur (London, June 2011), Hamar 
iyo Hamardaye (Nairobi, April 2011) and Greenland State of Juba (Nairobi, November 
2010). For a compilation of flags and names of some 21 quasi-independent and semi-
autonomous regions, see ‘Quasi-independent and semi-autonomous regions in Somalia 
(A–G), Flags of the World. Accessed 10 December 2015, http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/
FLAGS/so-ind1.html.
165 This is known in international relations theory as ‘judicial statehood’ as opposed to 
real or ‘empirical statehood’. See R. H. Jackson and C. G. Rosberg, ‘Why Africa’s weak 
states persist: the empirical and the juridical in statehood’, World Politics 35/1 (1982), 1–24.
166 P. Englebert, Africa: Unity, Sovereignty and Sorrow, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2009.
167 Bayart, ‘History of extraversion’, 260.
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personalized forms of escapism and escape.168 Although flight refers to a 
movement away from a particular place, it contributes to people’s inser-
tion into a globalized world. Flight is also important for understanding 
the relationship between the governed and those who govern as the 
movement of people ‘turns the state into a political space which is both 
relative and highly contested’.169 
Once again, a historical precedent must be noted when contrasting 
this particular mode of extraversion between pre and post-1991 Somalia. 
Some 700,000 refugees had fled to Somalia after the disastrous 1977–1978 
Ogaden war with Ethiopia. Emergency aid and resettlement schemes run 
by the government’s National Refugee Commission then gave way to 
an international relief industry that benefited the Somali government.170 
Since the end of the 1980s, a large proportion of relief aid has targeted 
war-displaced Somalis in the country and in neighbouring Ethiopia171 
and Kenya.172 Humanitarian aid to Somalis fleeing war and famine saved 
thousands of refugees through feeding programmes and the provision 
of shelter, water, sanitation and other services. While not considered 
to be stabilization in the contemporary sense, refugee aid has been 
instrumental in stabilizing the lives of those recently displaced and, 
subsequently, of maintaining large refugee populations in camps like 
Dadaab or Kakuma in north-eastern Kenya.173
168 The widespread addiction to the mildly narcotic khat leaf among male Somalis is an 
indicator of escapism. 
169 Bayart, ‘History of extraversion’, 260–261.
170 Lewis, Modern History, 247.
171 K. van Brabant, Bad Borders Make Bad Neighbours: The Political Economy of Relief and 
Rehabilitation in the Somali Region 5, Eastern Ethiopia, London: Overseas Development 
Institute, 1994. 
172 C. Horst, Transnational Nomads: How Somalis Cope with Refugee Life in the Dadaab Camps of 
Kenya, Oxford: Berghahn, 2006.
173 M-A. Perouse de Montclos and P. M. Kagwanja, ‘Refugee camps or cities? The socio-
economic dynamics of the Dadaab and Kakuma camps in Northern Kenya’, Journal of 
Refugee Studies 13/2 (2000), 205–22 and B. J. Jansen, ‘“Digging aid”: the camp as an option 
in East and the Horn of Africa’, Journal of Refugee Studies, doi: 10.1093/jrs/fev018, 2015.
 somaLi sTaTEbUiLDing bY EXTRaVERsion 47
Mass population displacement might not immediately appear relevant 
as a factor that determines how external stabilization affects local political 
settlements. Yet from a longer term perspective a connection between 
these two phenomena emerges. Forced migration has mostly been the 
result of coercion, as well as droughts and famines.174 In the first quarter 
of 2016, the registered Somali refugee population in the greater Horn of 
Africa region alone was nearly one million.175 Longstanding out-migra-
tions of Somalis—from guest workers in Saudi Arabia during the early 
1970s to the mid-1980s, to refugees fleeing government oppression and 
clan militias in the late 1980s and early 1990s and, more recently, the 
fighting between AMISOM, the FGS and al-Shabaab176—has led to the 
creation of a global Somali diaspora. In recent years, this diaspora has 
become part of Somalia’s political settlement by actively engaging in stabi-
lizing and destabilizing the country. In the past decade, Somali diaspora 
groups have reinserted177 themselves into humanitarian aid, political 
brokerage and statebuilding across the Somali territories.178 Diaspora 
groups have positioned themselves as ‘agents of development’.179 They 
‘enthusiastically provide assistance to various political authorities back 
home’180 and also engage in peacebuilding and mediation.181 Diaspora 
174 A. Lindley, ‘Displacement in contested places: governance, movement and settlement 
in the Somali territories’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 7/2 (2013), 291–313.
175 ‘Refugees in the Horn of Africa: Somali displacement crisis’, United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees. Accessed 11 December 2015, http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-
africa/regional.php.
176 Lindley, ‘Leaving Mogadishu’. 
177 This term is from Bayart, ‘History of extraversion’.
178 At times, reinsertion was of limited duration; for example, see the case of former 
Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed’s short-lived tenure in J. Leland, ‘After a 
break to run Somalia, back at his cubicle’, New York Times, 6 December 2011.
179 N. Kleist, ‘Mobilising “the diaspora”: Somali transnational political engagement’, 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 34/2 (2008), 307–23.
180 M. V. Hoehne et al., ‘Differentiating the Diaspora: Reflections on Diasporic 
Engagement “for Peace” in the Horn of Africa’, Working Paper No. 124, Max Planck 
Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle, Germany, 2010, 10.
181 N. Majid, ‘Livelihoods, Development and the Somali Diaspora’, PhD thesis, 
University of Bristol, 2013.
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returnees have figured prominently in consecutive TFG, Somaliland 
and Puntland administrations but also in the running of local political 
entities and businesses. The current attraction of tahriib and migration 
for young Somalis is partly motivated by a quest to find education and 
income abroad, in the hope of a future return to Somalia as successful 
businessmen or women.182 Consequently, flight has left its marks on 
statebuilding both indirectly—by inviting humanitarian relief—and 
directly—by creating a class of often more educated professionals and 
activists who reinsert themselves in local political settlements.183
Intermediation
The archetype of institutionalized intermediation was British indirect 
rule, which delegated everyday governance to newly created or co-opted 
chiefs. Intermediation is a mode of extraversion practiced by a wide 
range of social categories that position themselves to take advantage of 
colonial and postcolonial relations of dependence. For example, promi-
nent examples of colonial intermediaries include African ‘catechists, 
interpreters, school-teachers, nurses, clerks and traders’ but also ‘foreign 
or transnational imperial elites’, such as Asians or Lebanese, prophets 
and religious movements.184
In contemporary Somalia intermediation takes different forms. It 
manifests itself in the donor-dependent FGS, local and international 
NGOs, civil society actors and advocacy groups, which often pursue 
parochial, clan-based agendas. Intermediation was also produced 
during the UNOSOM period when the international community collab-
orated with and promoted traditional leaders, encouraging ‘political, 
business or factional entrepreneurs’ to create customary authorities.185 
182 P. Hansen, ‘Revolving returnees: meanings and practices of transnational return 
among Somalilanders’, PhD thesis, University of Copenhagen, 2007 and N-I. Ali, Tahriib: 
Somali Youth and the Precarious Journey to Europe, Nairobi: Rift Valley Institute, 2015. 
183 Diaspora experience has increasingly become a prerequisite for attaining (political) 
elite status in Somalia.
184 Bayart, ‘History of extraversion’, 261.
185 Marchal, ‘Warlordism’, 1099.
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Senior positions in many humanitarian and development organiza-
tions continue to be occupied by expatriates, with educated Somali aid 
workers—another example of intermediaries of external stabilization—
taking mid-level management jobs in these organizations. In refugee 
and Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps throughout Somalia, local 
camp managers who control access to land and local power holders act 
as gatekeepers—to the detriment of the displaced. These gatekeepers 
effectively intermediate between foreign humanitarian aid and refugee 
populations.186 Both Somalis and non-Somalis have also been mediating 
Western counterterrorism policy since 2001. Among them is the coalition 
of Mogadishu warlords who formed the Alliance for the Restoration of 
Peace and Counterterrorism in February 2006, tendering their services 
to the US intelligence community. The TFG, AMISOM, Somaliland and 
Puntland187 have made use of private security companies against piracy 
and radical Islamists.188 This reflects a broader trend. Somali private 
security companies, another intermediary, have replaced local militia 
and individual security guards in securing international organizations’ 
compounds and infrastructure in Somalia.189 
Since 2007, AMISOM soldiers have mediated global stabilization 
efforts, namely Western counterterrorism concerns, as well as the FGS’s 
security agenda.190 AMISOM initially had a limited protection mandate 
but developed into a ‘conventional military counterterrorism force’ and, 
in 2011, adopted a more comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy 
186 Human Rights Watch, ‘Hostages of the Gatekeepers. Abuses against Internally 
Displaced in Mogadishu, Somalia’, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2013, 21.
187 These private security companies were mostly paid by foreign sponsors—e.g. the 
Gulf States.
188 S. J. Hansen, ‘Private security and local politics in Somalia’, Review of African Political 
Economy 35/118 (2008), 585–98. On Bankcroft Global Development, see Moe, ‘The strange 
wars of liberal peace’, 10.
189 In times of widespread political violence, the mediation of foreign policy interests 
invariably becomes involved in coercion, which is the first mode of extraversion.
190 Major offensives by AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA) dislodged al-
Shabaab from many parts of Mogadishu (November 2010 and February 2011), Badhaade 
(February 2012), Kismayo (September 2012), and Afmadow and Afgoye (May 2014). 
Source: International Crisis Group, ‘It Will Be a Long War’.
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that includes ‘multi-stakeholder dialogue and reconciliation’, stabili-
zation, disarmament, humanitarian protection work and even human 
rights training.191 Financed by the EU, the United States and the UN but 
operationalized by African soldiers, AMISOM represents a classic case 
of intermediation. As part of AMISOM, troop-contributing countries 
Ethiopia,192 Uganda and Kenya can pursue their own security agendas 
and economic interests in Somalia, where they have soldiers on the 
ground.193 Concomitantly, their participation in AMISOM makes them 
reliable partners in the global war against terror for Western donors, 
which no longer send their own troops to African conflict zones.194 
Counter-insurgency and the expansion of the federal government’s 
territorial presence is thus—with the exception of some government-
affiliated Somali militias—predominantly shouldered by foreigners. That 
is, fought by African neighbours and assisted by foreign security firms 
and Western counterterrorism specialists.
What is the significance of foreign intermediaries in implementing 
the TFG and FGS’s military operations and stabilization policy? Firstly, 
they demonstrate the multi-layered and nested strategies of extraversion 
present in contemporary Somalia. State-centric processes of statebuilding, 
stabilization and counter-insurgency are heavily internationalized—to 
the point that external actors take pre-eminence over Somalis. Secondly, 
the prominence of external forces and funding in fighting al-Shabaab 
partly undermines the very statebuilding it is supposed to assist. Not only 
191 Moe, ‘The strange wars of liberal peace’, 8–9.
192 Ethiopia formally joined AMISOM in January 2014, providing some 4,000 troops. 
Since 1996, Ethiopia has regularly dispatched its troops to south-central Somalia, 
first against al-Ittihad al-Islaam (The Islamic Union) in Gedo Region and later, backing 
particular clan factions in Bay and Bakool from 2006 to 2008, as part of a broader 
occupation following the ouster of the ICU and more recently as part of AMISOM. Also 
see M. Bryden, ’No quick fixes: coming to terms with terrorism, Islam and statelessness 
in Somalia’, Journal of Conflict Studies 23/2 (2003), 24–56.
193 Albrecht and Haenlein, ‘Fragmented peacebuilding’.
194 On Uganda and AMISOM, see J. Fisher, ‘Managing donor perceptions: 
contextualizing Uganda’s 2007 intervention in Somalia’, African Affairs 111/444 (2012), 
404–23 and Marchal, ‘Warlordism’. 
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does the presence of so many foreigners play into al-Shabaab propaganda 
but abuses by AMISOM troops—indiscriminate shelling of residential 
areas in Mogadishu after attacks on their soldiers and highly publicized 
sexual violence against women and girls—are reminders of preda-
tory state authority rather than the democratic promise of the federal 
government.195 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the outsourcing 
of violence to AMISOM by the FGS is unlikely to stabilize the country’s 
political settlement because it hinges on continued external funding and 
the contradictory security interests of Ethiopia and Kenya.196
Appropriation
Appropriation is at the centre of any extraversion activity that garners 
authority and resources from dominant outside powers. It includes 
non-material elements, for instance learning a new language or new 
religious practices, the adoption of Western lifestyles, tastes, goods 
and clothes, or socialization in new milieus.197 In the realm of the polit-
ical imaginary, appropriation includes the transfer and adaptation of 
meanings and thus the authentification of new ideas and discourses.198 
Clearly, both in colonial Africa and present-day south-central Somalia, 
the imported state, which was and is so often governed with coercion, 
needed first to be appropriated. In civil war Somalia, this has occurred 
not once but repeatedly. Political leaders embraced juridical statehood—
and accompanying external recognition—when they formed a series of 
195 Human Rights Watch, ‘“You Don’t Know Who to Blame”: War Crimes in Somalia’, 
Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2011 and Human Rights Watch, ‘“The Power 
These Men Have Over Us”: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by African Union Forces in 
Somalia’, Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2014.
196 Albrecht and Haenlein, ‘Fragmented peacebuilding’. The FGS may also be described 
as an ‘internationally sponsored plan for a vertically integrated cartel to manage the 
Somali political marketplace’. Source: de Waal, Real Politics of the Horn of Africa, 124.
197 Bayart, ‘History of extraversion’, 262. On the broader significance of appropriation 
and adaptation as debated in cultural studies and postcolonial theory, see P. Nicklas and 
O. Lindner, Adaptation and Cultural Appropriation, Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012 and J. Sanders, 
Adaptation and Appropriation, London and New York: Routledge, 2005.
198 J-F. Bayart, The Illusion of Cultural Identity, London: Hurst, 2005.
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transitional governments from 2000 onwards. State-centric stabilization 
that entails the creation of Somali national transitional governments has 
‘often privilege[d] some groups and systems of governance over others’, 
creating ‘a political economy of prestige and resources around the newly 
built or reformed state’.199 
Numerous examples of illegal appropriation of foreign resources 
occurred in Somalia after the downfall of the Siyad Barre government. 
During the UNOSOM–UNITAF (Unified Task Force) period, rival 
factions fought over aid resources, leading to ‘criticisms that humani-
tarian agencies were fuelling a war economy’.200 The diversion of aid, 
such as the theft of food aid by armed groups and contractors, continues 
to be a headache for humanitarian agencies.201 Extraversion by appropria-
tion is not limited to material resources or physical assets, such as food 
aid, vehicles, buildings, materials or weapons. Somalis have actively 
appropriated the humanitarian, development and diplomatic rhetoric, 
paradigms and blueprints that have accompanied consecutive external 
stabilization attempts. Western discourses centered on secular political 
concepts such as ‘democracy’, ‘federalism’ and ‘human rights’ or military 
vocabulary such as ‘counterterrorism’ and ‘stabilization’, quickly find 
currency among Somali leaders who use them to their own ends.202 Spiri-
tual and religious beliefs have also been appropriated from Saudi Arabia, 
the Gulf States, Egypt and Sudan by a new Salafi business elite, whose 
ascendancy in Somali politics has reconfigured the political settlement 
over the past 15 or so years.203 
The intimate connection between internationalized political stabiliza-
tion and local appropriation cannot be stressed enough when accounting 
for the failures of state-centric statebuilding in south-central Somalia. In 
199 Mac Ginty, ‘Against stabilisation’, 28.
200 Bradbury, State-building, 16.
201 United Nations, Security Council, ‘Report of the Monitoring Group’.
202 N. O. Elmi, ‘Making democracy work: tools, theories and templates of vernacular 
democracy in Somalia’s rebuilding’, MA thesis, University of Oslo, 2014.
203 R. Marchal and Z. M. Sheikh, ‘Salafism in Somalia: coping with coercion, civil war 
and its own contradictions’, Islamic Africa 6 (2015), 135–63. 
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sum, formal state structures ‘have been used to attract aid, and as a useful 
source of patronage … but seldom as providers of essential services and 
public goods’.204 Consequently, ‘Political elites in newly declared govern-
ments have devoted most of their energies toward securing foreign aid 
in the name of statebuilding.’205 Because Somali elites have regularly 
turned their participation in transitional governments into a resource 
appropriation tactic, statebuilding has become an end in itself rather 
than the outcome of a more profound process of actual state formation 
that would have entailed the centralization of coercion, the generation 
of public revenue, the provision of public services and the building up of 
popular support. Since 2000, Somali transitional governments that have 
claimed to be the sovereign successor of the former Somali Democratic 
Republic have increasingly suffered from this self-defeating dynamic. 
The TNG, for instance, did not enjoy international recognition but its 
leadership obtained around USD 50 million from Arab Gulf States in 
the two years of its existence between 2000 and 2002.206 Successive 
TFG cabinets managed to increase their hold on foreign aid as donors 
refocused their efforts on strengthening a central government after 
the rise of al-Shabaab and the end of the Ethiopian occupation. This 
ongoing effort to breathe new life into the TFG included, among other 
things, direct salary payments to members of parliament and its security 
forces.207 In many ways, the extraversion strategies pursued by political 
figures who were part of the transitional and now of federal governments 
are not a surprise. They are the logical consequence of the commodifica-
tion that had occurred in their formative stages, during the peace and 
reconciliation conferences that created them.208 
204 Menkhaus, ‘Somalia and the Horn of Africa’, 11.
205 Menkhaus, ‘Somalia and the Horn of Africa’, 11.
206 Menkhaus, ‘Somalia and the Horn of Africa’, 11. 
207 See Hills, ‘Somalia works’. 
208 C. Webersik, ‘Bargaining for the spoils of war: Somalia’s failing path from peace to 
war’, African Security 7/4 (2014), 277–302 (278). This pattern was already present during 
the brokerage of the 1994 peace agreement between Ali Mahdi and Mohammed Farah 
Aideed, during which the UN paid participants’ hotel bills ‘running at USD 150,000 
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One of the most problematic extraversion strategies in peace and 
statebuilding is the appropriation, both by Somali political leaders and 
the international community, of fixed definitions of clan identity as a 
parameter for power-sharing. In the flux and confusion that so often 
characterizes interactions between competing armed and political groups 
in Somalia, the word ‘clan’ is often assumed to be the fundamental 
category that informs Somali political life. The international community 
often fails to account for the ‘diversity of local social groups’, instead 
treating clans as ‘fixed entities’, and thus ‘contribut[ing] to the prolifera-
tion of clan and sub-clan identities’.209 
The suggestion that the fragmentation of Somali society along clan 
lineages is primarily the result of colonial anthropologists and foreign 
interventions appears far-fetched.210 International statebuilding and extra-
version, however, certainly contribute to the spread, entrenchment and 
reproduction of political representation based on a problematic notion 
of fixed clan identities. Faction leaders, politicians, elders and business-
people use their family ties not only to mobilize support internally but 
they also appropriate the idea of clan as the predominant criterion for 
determining power-sharing and representation in statebuilding. The 
adoption of the famous 4.5 formula, during the formation of the first 
TNG in August 2000, marks the highpoint of this appropriation strategy 
by which kinship is made productive by interaction with external stabi-
lizers.211 Considered to be a pragmatic way of attaining power-sharing 
a day’. Source: Lewis, Modern History, 274. Stories abound about corruption and the 
payments made during the Eldoret and Mbagathi peace processes that led to the creation 
of the first TFG.
209 Little, Economy without State, 155, making an observation about the UN intervention.
210 This argument was made by Abdi I. Samatar in a lecture held at the Chr. Michelsen 
Institute, Bergen, Norway, 8 May 2014.
211 The 4.5 formula for clan representation ‘envision[ed] 400 seats divided evenly 
between the four major clan groups, and minority groups collectively receiving half as 
many seats as a major clan’. Source: International Crisis Group, ‘Salvaging Somalia’s 
Chance for Peace’, Africa Briefing n. 11, Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 
9 December 2002, 5. The formula was repeatedly used in bargaining power-sharing 
agreements and for allocating seats for legislative and executive positions in the 
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among Somalis, the 4.5 formula encouraged the nomination of officials 
who—apart from being members of particular clan networks—often had 
little political clout or personal credibility and lacked a track record of 
actual political achievements.212 Precisely because state-centric stabiliza-
tion entails a centralization of power, it encourages the proliferation and 
hardening of clan lineage identity that is instrumentally appropriated by 
elites who seek to increase their role in bargaining processes. Conse-
quently, the politicized use and abuse of the idea of clan in post-1991 
Somalia is not merely the result of local tradition or culture, as primordi-
alists suggest, but has been co-produced by extraversion under conditions 
of external stabilization.
Rejection 
Even though extraversion has been an ingrained pattern of stabilization 
and statebuilding in post-1991 Somalia, not all actors have succumbed to 
it. Rejection of external resources and agendas, rather than appropria-
tion, has also taken place. A telling case of partial opposition to external 
intervention can be found in the Somaliland government’s dealings 
with international organizations, particularly its fraught relationship 
with various UN agencies dating back to the early 1990s.213 Al-Shabaab’s 
position has consistently been characterized by marked rejection of the 
international community’s statebuilding agenda and of interference by 
frontline states Ethiopia and Kenya. Conversely, al-Shabaab arguably 
pursues its own, predominantly immaterial, extraversion by positioning 
itself as part of a global Islamic movement. Its declaration of allegiance 
transitional governments. Other administrations, such as in Somaliland and Puntland, 
have adopted similar proportional clan representation mechanisms.
212 The problem of politicians and parliamentarians who are part of formal statebuilding 
exercises but ‘represent … themselves rather than anyone else’ was already noted during 
the Arta conference. Source: Lewis, Modern History, 293. This is partly the result of a 
decentralized patriarchal pastoral political culture in which, historically, every man was 
allowed to speak and participate in politics.
213 Somaliland’s strained relations with the UN is motivated by the latter’s refusal to 
fully recognize the self-declared republic. These strained relations continue to persist; 
e.g. Somaliland’s rejection of the UN population census in May 2015.
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to al-Qaeda in February 2012 is evidence of this. Although rejection is 
the opposite of appropriation, it often goes hand in hand with extra-
version.214 Two brief examples illustrate this. First, while TFG soldiers 
appropriate external resources provided by foreign donors, they simul-
taneously reject or undermine stabilization when they mistreat civilians. 
Second, while bandits may loot the property of a humanitarian organiz-
ation—which could be seen as rejection of extraversion—at the same 
time they ‘assimilat[e] the symbolic forms or the military technology of 
the contemporary world’.215 
214 Bayart, ‘History of extraversion’, 263-265. Accordingly, ‘forms of rejection can also be 
modes of appropriation and reinvention, just as nationalist movements were in matters 
of state institutions and the imagery of the state in the years after the Second World 
War’.
215 Bayart, ‘History of extraversion’, 264.
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5. Conclusion
Extraversion has been a frequent cause and feature of failed interna-
tionalized statebuilding in south-central Somalia over the past quarter 
century. Evidence points towards an inverse relationship between 
external stabilization and peaceful elite bargaining in post-1991 Somalia. 
Statebuilding that is more coercive has increased rather than reduced 
violent conflict. Recurrent extraversion strategies such as the use of 
violence, the appropriation of external resources, flight and trickery have 
been obstacles to both peace and statebuilding. They have led Somali 
and external statebuilders to prefer the creation of formal institutions 
to actual state formation. External recognition bestowed on particular 
domestic political actors, policy processes or institutions has fuelled 
competition between and among local and national elites. It has also 
encouraged abuses and ineffective governance, while also undermining 
important liberal and democratic statebuilding objectives. The dysfunc-
tional effects of internationalized statebuilding in south-central Somalia 
are the result of both external and elite Somali agendas.
Donors’ current stabilization programmes and their alignment with 
the Federal Government of Somalia resemble a ‘peacebuilder’s contract’ 
by which external actors, state and sub-national elites produce state-
building that is either compromised or captured.216 As donors and the FGS 
enter into a statebuilding alliance, their interactions centre once again 
on extraversion and the production of formal—but largely fictitious—
statehood. Even if a concerted political and military effort succeeded in 
pacifying Somalia and expanding the government’s degree of statehood, 
it is unlikely to transform the type of state it represents.217 The reason for 
this is that external actors are themselves part of a political settlement 
that includes domestic elites who have co-opted statebuilding resources 
216 M. Barnett and C. Zürcher, ‘The peacebuilder’s contract: how external statebuilding 
reinforces weak statehood’, in The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of 
Postwar Peace Operations, eds. R. Paris and T.D. Sisk, London: Routledge, 2009, 24.
217 Barnett and Zürcher, ‘The peacebuilder’s contract’, 6.
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and rhetoric for their own survival.218 If history is an indicator for the 
future, current stabilization policies and the international community’s 
support of the FGS are unlikely to be either sustainable or effective.
The overwhelming evidence of past statebuilding in civil war Somalia 
points to a sobering conclusion. External stabilization that affords local 
and national elites extraversion opportunities has often reproduced 
political instability. It has encouraged the formation of political admin-
istrations that are unaccountable at best, predatory at worst, and usually 
ineffective. From the colonial period until now, centralized state authority 
in Somalia has been dependent on external rents, fostering political 
elites whose survival has depended and continues to depend on external 
recognition. While a future state must be and will be built in Somalia, it 
cannot simply be rebuilt, as neither colonial nor postcolonial administra-
tions serve as models to emulate. Nor will a working state emerge as a 
result of liberal Western blueprints transposed—both by foreigners and 
by Somalis—to local political realities. Instead, state formation is likely 
to proceed on the basis of more stable political settlements that are not 
primarily geared towards the outside world but result from domestic 
bargaining, resource mobilization and, ultimately, recognition.
Conversely, statebuilding in places such as Somaliland has been 
successful because it was based on ‘peace contracts’219 among local constit-
uencies, contracts that were renegotiated over time, were predominantly 
funded by the participants themselves and did not follow predefined 
templates or outcomes. Importantly, the negotiation of these agreements 
was not based on converting external resources into local authority, 
although Somaliland’s claim to international recognition clearly follows 
a strategy of extraversion. Instead they were locally initiated, funded and 
implemented.220 While political settlements have simply been reshuffled 
218 Also see Menkhaus, ‘Aid and Institution-building’, 1.
219 Farah and Lewis, ‘Roots of Reconciliation’.
220 A telling example of this is the fact that Somaliland clan elders were instrumental 
in disarming and demobilizing their own militias in the early 1990s, while armed groups 
in Mogadishu repeatedly refused to hand over their weapons to the government of the 
moment. See Bryden and Brickhill, ‘Disarming Somalia’.
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in south-central Somalia—at times involving rather arbitrary appoint-
ments of officials and the recycling of leaders—in Somaliland, and to a 
lesser degree in Puntland, political settlements have survived because 
locally driven stabilization was proceeded by negotiation, compen sation 
and trust-building among key constituencies.221 In summary, under 
external state-centric stabilization, local elites convert financial and 
social capital into social relations that are beneficial for them. Under 
locally owned statebuilding, social relations are transformed into polit-
ical capital which benefits broader segments of society while resources 
such as tax revenue and foreign aid are redistributed.
221 It also involved traditional institutions and a particular relation of local elites to the 
economy. See W. Reno, Somalia and Survival in the Shadow of the Global Economy, Oxford: 
Queen Elizabeth House, 2003.
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6. Policy implications
The policy implications of these observations suggest a rethinking and 
redesigning of statebuilding strategies in Somalia. Complete political 
disengagement from Somalia is neither a realistic nor a desirable policy 
option. But interventions will have to find a way to reduce the negative 
effects of statebuilding by extraversion. Future policy should consider 
the following. 
Reorienting financial resources for statebuilding 
Statebuilding budgets should be reoriented in order to limit extraversion 
opportunities. Policies and programmes should consider changing their 
incentive structure. Instead of rewarding elite promises that bank on 
external funding, aid could be given to actors, institutions and processes 
that have a proven track record of creating social contracts and public 
goods. Where this is absent, statebuilding resources could be withheld.
Finding statebuilding partners with capacities for domestic resource 
and political mobilization 
More effort is required to identify formal and informal institutions, both 
in Somalia and abroad, which have existed before and independently of 
external funding opportunities and which might become partners for 
joint statebuilding interventions at local and national levels. Policies 
should consider encouraging local actors to create a realistic and more 
durable political settlement that is based on domestic resource and polit-
ical mobilization. Although in principle the existing aid structure already 
adopts these aims, the geopolitical, security and strategic considerations 
of donors regularly lead them to disregard these.
Creating space for an alternative trajectory for state formation
In light of the ongoing counter-insurgency operations against al-Shabaab 
and shared donor willingness to defend the FGS, urgency and improvi-
sation are likely to preoccupy statebuilders more than anything else. In 
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spite of these pressing matters, arguably there is a need for Somalis to 
debate and develop long-term visions and strategies for the creation of 
a new Somali state that minimizes external dependence, draws upon 
domestic resources, popular support and locally negotiated political 
settlements. It is this hard work of envisioning and realizing an alterna-
tive trajectory to state formation in south-central Somalia that is perhaps 
the most important. 
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Glossary of acronyms, words  
and phrases
AMISOM African Union Mission to Somalia, African Union-
led peacekeeping mission in Somalia begun in 
2007
briefcase NGO/ a fraudulent organization set up for the sole
organization purpose of obtaining money from donors but 
having no programmes on the ground
DFID UK Department for International Development
FGS Federal Government of Somalia, established in 
August 2012; also known as the FSG
ICU Islamic Courts Union
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, 
headquartered in Djibouti 
khat mildly narcotic plant (catha edulis) native to the 
Horn of Africa
SNA Somali National Army
SPF Somali Police Force
SSF Somali Stability Fund, a multi-donor initiative 
financed by Denmark, the EU, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, the UK and the United Arab Emirates
TFG Transitional Federal Government, established in 
November 2004 and ended in August 2012, when 
it was replaced by the Federal Government of 
Somalia 
TNG Transitional National Government, established in 
August 2000 and replaced by the TFG in 2004
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tahriib (Arabic) term referring to a specific form of illegal 
emigration that involves a large number of young 
Somali men and women leaving for Europe via 
Ethiopia, Sudan and Libya, and then across the 
Mediterranean Sea
TIS Transition Initiatives for Stabilization
UNOSOM United Nations Operations in Somalia, started in 
1992 and ended in 1995; consisted of UNOSOM I 
(April 1992–March 1993) and UNOSOM II (March 
1993–March 1995) 
UNITAF Unified Task Force, a US-led multinational force 
operating in Somalia (December 1992–May 1993); 
code-named Operation Restore Hope
USAID United States Agency for International 
Development
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This study uses the concept of extraversion to show how different Somali 
actors—who do not share the statebuilding vision of international donors—
have successfully used externally driven peacebuilding and statebuilding 
projects to their advantage. Moving away from established narratives on the 
tribulations of such projects, this approach not only transfers agency back to 
Somalis in internationally engineered interventions, but also demonstrates the 
need to rethink statebuilding strategies. In doing so, it provides fresh insights 
to policymakers and academics working on Somalia.
—asnaKE KEFaLE, DEPaRTmEnT oF PoLiTiCaL sCiEnCE anD 
inTERnaTionaL RELaTions, aDDis ababa UniVERsiTY
In critically exploring 25 years of internationalized statebuilding in south-
central Somalia with Bayart’s concept of extraversion, this report brings a 
thought-provoking perspective on how and why statebuilding efforts have 
repeatedly failed. It also establishes a much needed link between Somali 
political processes and a broader literature on the state in Africa.
—FaDUma abUKaR mURsaL, maX PLanCK insTiTUTE FoR  
soCiaL anTHRoPoLogY, HaLLE/saaLE 
Why is Somalia still far from achieving a lasting political settlement, after decades 
of international military, diplomatic and aid interventions to stabilize the war-
torn country? This study argues that international aid and the interplay between 
local and foreign elites in policies and practices has frequently undermined 
state-building efforts in Somalia. Rather than assuming that foreign actors 
are external to the evolving conflict dynamics of warlord economies, militant 
Islamism or political settlements, Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements 
in Somalia concludes that they should instead be understood as integral to them. 
Consequently, the power and interests of both Somali and international actors 
must be considered in order to understand the shortcomings of stabilization 
policies. 
